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85c87212005-04-29 16:23:29 +01001/* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07002 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
3 *
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00005 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05006 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07007 * All Rights Reserved.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
13 *
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
18 *
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
22 *
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
24 *
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
27 *
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
31 *
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -050032 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
33 * 2006.
34 *
Dustin Kirklandb63862f2005-11-03 15:41:46 +000035 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
37 *
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +000038 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +000040 *
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070043 */
44
45#include <linux/init.h>
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070046#include <asm/types.h>
Alan Cox715b49e2006-01-18 17:44:07 -080047#include <asm/atomic.h>
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +000048#include <linux/fs.h>
49#include <linux/namei.h>
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070050#include <linux/mm.h>
51#include <linux/module.h>
Stephen Smalley01116102005-05-21 00:15:52 +010052#include <linux/mount.h>
David Woodhouse3ec3b2f2005-05-17 12:08:48 +010053#include <linux/socket.h>
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -050054#include <linux/mqueue.h>
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070055#include <linux/audit.h>
56#include <linux/personality.h>
57#include <linux/time.h>
David Woodhouse5bb289b2005-06-24 14:14:05 +010058#include <linux/netlink.h>
David Woodhousef5561962005-07-13 22:47:07 +010059#include <linux/compiler.h>
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070060#include <asm/unistd.h>
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +000061#include <linux/security.h>
David Woodhousefe7752b2005-12-15 18:33:52 +000062#include <linux/list.h>
Steve Grubba6c043a2006-01-01 14:07:00 -050063#include <linux/tty.h>
Al Viro473ae302006-04-26 14:04:08 -040064#include <linux/binfmts.h>
Al Viroa1f8e7f72006-10-19 16:08:53 -040065#include <linux/highmem.h>
Al Virof46038f2006-05-06 08:22:52 -040066#include <linux/syscalls.h>
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -040067#include <linux/inotify.h>
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +110068#include <linux/capability.h>
Al Viro5ad4e532009-03-29 19:50:06 -040069#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070070
David Woodhousefe7752b2005-12-15 18:33:52 +000071#include "audit.h"
72
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070073/* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
74 * for saving names from getname(). */
75#define AUDIT_NAMES 20
76
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -040077/* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
78#define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
79
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -050080/* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
81#define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
82
Al Viro471a5c72006-07-10 08:29:24 -040083/* number of audit rules */
84int audit_n_rules;
85
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -040086/* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
87int audit_signals;
88
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +110089struct audit_cap_data {
90 kernel_cap_t permitted;
91 kernel_cap_t inheritable;
92 union {
93 unsigned int fE; /* effective bit of a file capability */
94 kernel_cap_t effective; /* effective set of a process */
95 };
96};
97
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070098/* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
99 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
100 * pointers at syscall exit time).
101 *
102 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
103struct audit_names {
104 const char *name;
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -0400105 int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */
106 unsigned name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700107 unsigned long ino;
108 dev_t dev;
109 umode_t mode;
110 uid_t uid;
111 gid_t gid;
112 dev_t rdev;
Steve Grubb1b50eed2006-04-03 14:06:13 -0400113 u32 osid;
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +1100114 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
115 unsigned int fcap_ver;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700116};
117
118struct audit_aux_data {
119 struct audit_aux_data *next;
120 int type;
121};
122
123#define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
124
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400125/* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
126#define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
127
Al Viro473ae302006-04-26 14:04:08 -0400128struct audit_aux_data_execve {
129 struct audit_aux_data d;
130 int argc;
131 int envc;
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -0700132 struct mm_struct *mm;
Al Viro473ae302006-04-26 14:04:08 -0400133};
134
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400135struct audit_aux_data_pids {
136 struct audit_aux_data d;
137 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -0500138 uid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
139 uid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -0500140 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400141 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -0500142 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400143 int pid_count;
144};
145
Eric Paris3fc689e2008-11-11 21:48:18 +1100146struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
147 struct audit_aux_data d;
148 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
149 unsigned int fcap_ver;
150 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
151 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
152};
153
Eric Parise68b75a02008-11-11 21:48:22 +1100154struct audit_aux_data_capset {
155 struct audit_aux_data d;
156 pid_t pid;
157 struct audit_cap_data cap;
158};
159
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -0400160struct audit_tree_refs {
161 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
162 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
163};
164
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700165/* The per-task audit context. */
166struct audit_context {
Al Virod51374a2006-08-03 10:59:26 -0400167 int dummy; /* must be the first element */
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700168 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500169 enum audit_state state, current_state;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700170 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700171 int major; /* syscall number */
Eric Paris44e51a12009-08-07 16:54:29 -0400172 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700173 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
2fd6f582005-04-29 16:08:28 +0100174 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500175 u64 prio;
Eric Paris44e51a12009-08-07 16:54:29 -0400176 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700177 int name_count;
178 struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
Amy Griffis5adc8a62006-06-14 18:45:21 -0400179 char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */
Jan Blunck44707fd2008-02-14 19:38:33 -0800180 struct path pwd;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700181 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
182 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400183 struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids;
Al Viro4f6b4342008-12-09 19:50:34 -0500184 struct sockaddr_storage *sockaddr;
185 size_t sockaddr_len;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700186 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
Al Virof46038f2006-05-06 08:22:52 -0400187 pid_t pid, ppid;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700188 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
189 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
190 unsigned long personality;
2fd6f582005-04-29 16:08:28 +0100191 int arch;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700192
Al Viroa5cb0132007-03-20 13:58:35 -0400193 pid_t target_pid;
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -0500194 uid_t target_auid;
195 uid_t target_uid;
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -0500196 unsigned int target_sessionid;
Al Viroa5cb0132007-03-20 13:58:35 -0400197 u32 target_sid;
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -0500198 char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
Al Viroa5cb0132007-03-20 13:58:35 -0400199
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -0400200 struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
Al Viro916d7572009-06-24 00:02:38 -0400201 struct list_head killed_trees;
Eric Paris44e51a12009-08-07 16:54:29 -0400202 int tree_count;
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -0400203
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -0500204 int type;
205 union {
206 struct {
207 int nargs;
208 long args[6];
209 } socketcall;
Al Viroa33e6752008-12-10 03:40:06 -0500210 struct {
211 uid_t uid;
212 gid_t gid;
213 mode_t mode;
214 u32 osid;
Al Viroe816f372008-12-10 03:47:15 -0500215 int has_perm;
216 uid_t perm_uid;
217 gid_t perm_gid;
218 mode_t perm_mode;
219 unsigned long qbytes;
Al Viroa33e6752008-12-10 03:40:06 -0500220 } ipc;
Al Viro73929062008-12-10 06:58:59 -0500221 struct {
222 mqd_t mqdes;
223 struct mq_attr mqstat;
224 } mq_getsetattr;
Al Viro20114f72008-12-10 07:16:12 -0500225 struct {
226 mqd_t mqdes;
227 int sigev_signo;
228 } mq_notify;
Al Viroc32c8af2008-12-14 03:46:48 -0500229 struct {
230 mqd_t mqdes;
231 size_t msg_len;
232 unsigned int msg_prio;
233 struct timespec abs_timeout;
234 } mq_sendrecv;
Al Viro564f6992008-12-14 04:02:26 -0500235 struct {
236 int oflag;
237 mode_t mode;
238 struct mq_attr attr;
239 } mq_open;
Al Viro57f71a02009-01-04 14:52:57 -0500240 struct {
241 pid_t pid;
242 struct audit_cap_data cap;
243 } capset;
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -0500244 };
Al Viro157cf642008-12-14 04:57:47 -0500245 int fds[2];
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -0500246
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700247#if AUDIT_DEBUG
248 int put_count;
249 int ino_count;
250#endif
251};
252
Al Viro55669bf2006-08-31 19:26:40 -0400253static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
254{
255 int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
256 if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
257 n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
258 return n & mask;
259}
260
261static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
262{
Cordeliac4bacef2008-08-18 09:45:51 -0700263 unsigned n;
zhangxiliang1a61c882008-08-02 10:56:37 +0800264 if (unlikely(!ctx))
265 return 0;
Cordeliac4bacef2008-08-18 09:45:51 -0700266 n = ctx->major;
Alan Coxdbda4c02008-10-13 10:40:53 +0100267
Al Viro55669bf2006-08-31 19:26:40 -0400268 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
269 case 0: /* native */
270 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
271 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
272 return 1;
273 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
274 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
275 return 1;
276 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
277 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
278 return 1;
279 return 0;
280 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
281 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
282 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
283 return 1;
284 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
285 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
286 return 1;
287 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
288 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
289 return 1;
290 return 0;
291 case 2: /* open */
292 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
293 case 3: /* openat */
294 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
295 case 4: /* socketcall */
296 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
297 case 5: /* execve */
298 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
299 default:
300 return 0;
301 }
302}
303
Al Viro8b67dca2008-04-28 04:15:49 -0400304static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int which)
305{
306 unsigned index = which & ~S_IFMT;
307 mode_t mode = which & S_IFMT;
zhangxiliang1a61c882008-08-02 10:56:37 +0800308
309 if (unlikely(!ctx))
310 return 0;
311
Al Viro8b67dca2008-04-28 04:15:49 -0400312 if (index >= ctx->name_count)
313 return 0;
314 if (ctx->names[index].ino == -1)
315 return 0;
316 if ((ctx->names[index].mode ^ mode) & S_IFMT)
317 return 0;
318 return 1;
319}
320
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -0400321/*
322 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
323 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
324 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
325 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
326 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
327 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
328 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
329 */
330
331#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
Eric Paris679173b2009-01-26 18:09:45 -0500332static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
333{
334 if (!ctx->prio) {
335 ctx->prio = 1;
336 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
337 }
338}
339
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -0400340static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
341{
342 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
343 int left = ctx->tree_count;
344 if (likely(left)) {
345 p->c[--left] = chunk;
346 ctx->tree_count = left;
347 return 1;
348 }
349 if (!p)
350 return 0;
351 p = p->next;
352 if (p) {
353 p->c[30] = chunk;
354 ctx->trees = p;
355 ctx->tree_count = 30;
356 return 1;
357 }
358 return 0;
359}
360
361static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
362{
363 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
364 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
365 if (!ctx->trees) {
366 ctx->trees = p;
367 return 0;
368 }
369 if (p)
370 p->next = ctx->trees;
371 else
372 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
373 ctx->tree_count = 31;
374 return 1;
375}
376#endif
377
378static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
379 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
380{
381#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
382 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
383 int n;
384 if (!p) {
385 /* we started with empty chain */
386 p = ctx->first_trees;
387 count = 31;
388 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
389 if (!p)
390 return;
391 }
392 n = count;
393 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
394 while (n--) {
395 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
396 q->c[n] = NULL;
397 }
398 }
399 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
400 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
401 q->c[n] = NULL;
402 }
403 ctx->trees = p;
404 ctx->tree_count = count;
405#endif
406}
407
408static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
409{
410 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
411 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
412 q = p->next;
413 kfree(p);
414 }
415}
416
417static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
418{
419#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
420 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
421 int n;
422 if (!tree)
423 return 0;
424 /* full ones */
425 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
426 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
427 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
428 return 1;
429 }
430 /* partial */
431 if (p) {
432 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
433 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
434 return 1;
435 }
436#endif
437 return 0;
438}
439
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400440/* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700441/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
442 * otherwise. */
443static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500444 struct audit_krule *rule,
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700445 struct audit_context *ctx,
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400446 struct audit_names *name,
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700447 enum audit_state *state)
448{
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +1100449 const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
Steve Grubb2ad312d2006-04-11 08:50:56 -0400450 int i, j, need_sid = 1;
Darrel Goeddel3dc7e312006-03-10 18:14:06 -0600451 u32 sid;
452
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700453 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500454 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700455 int result = 0;
456
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500457 switch (f->type) {
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700458 case AUDIT_PID:
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500459 result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700460 break;
Al Viro3c662512006-05-06 08:26:27 -0400461 case AUDIT_PPID:
Alexander Viro419c58f2006-09-29 00:08:50 -0400462 if (ctx) {
463 if (!ctx->ppid)
464 ctx->ppid = sys_getppid();
Al Viro3c662512006-05-06 08:26:27 -0400465 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
Alexander Viro419c58f2006-09-29 00:08:50 -0400466 }
Al Viro3c662512006-05-06 08:26:27 -0400467 break;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700468 case AUDIT_UID:
David Howellsb6dff3e2008-11-14 10:39:16 +1100469 result = audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700470 break;
471 case AUDIT_EUID:
David Howellsb6dff3e2008-11-14 10:39:16 +1100472 result = audit_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700473 break;
474 case AUDIT_SUID:
David Howellsb6dff3e2008-11-14 10:39:16 +1100475 result = audit_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700476 break;
477 case AUDIT_FSUID:
David Howellsb6dff3e2008-11-14 10:39:16 +1100478 result = audit_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700479 break;
480 case AUDIT_GID:
David Howellsb6dff3e2008-11-14 10:39:16 +1100481 result = audit_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700482 break;
483 case AUDIT_EGID:
David Howellsb6dff3e2008-11-14 10:39:16 +1100484 result = audit_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700485 break;
486 case AUDIT_SGID:
David Howellsb6dff3e2008-11-14 10:39:16 +1100487 result = audit_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700488 break;
489 case AUDIT_FSGID:
David Howellsb6dff3e2008-11-14 10:39:16 +1100490 result = audit_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700491 break;
492 case AUDIT_PERS:
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500493 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700494 break;
2fd6f582005-04-29 16:08:28 +0100495 case AUDIT_ARCH:
Daniel Walker9f8dbe92007-10-18 03:06:09 -0700496 if (ctx)
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500497 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
2fd6f582005-04-29 16:08:28 +0100498 break;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700499
500 case AUDIT_EXIT:
501 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500502 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700503 break;
504 case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
David Woodhouseb01f2cc2005-08-27 10:25:43 +0100505 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500506 if (f->val)
507 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
David Woodhouseb01f2cc2005-08-27 10:25:43 +0100508 else
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500509 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
David Woodhouseb01f2cc2005-08-27 10:25:43 +0100510 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700511 break;
512 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400513 if (name)
514 result = audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev),
515 f->op, f->val);
516 else if (ctx) {
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700517 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500518 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700519 ++result;
520 break;
521 }
522 }
523 }
524 break;
525 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400526 if (name)
527 result = audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev),
528 f->op, f->val);
529 else if (ctx) {
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700530 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500531 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700532 ++result;
533 break;
534 }
535 }
536 }
537 break;
538 case AUDIT_INODE:
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400539 if (name)
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -0400540 result = (name->ino == f->val);
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400541 else if (ctx) {
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700542 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -0400543 if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val)) {
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700544 ++result;
545 break;
546 }
547 }
548 }
549 break;
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400550 case AUDIT_WATCH:
Eric Pariscfcad622009-06-11 14:31:36 -0400551 if (name && audit_watch_inode(rule->watch) != (unsigned long)-1)
552 result = (name->dev == audit_watch_dev(rule->watch) &&
553 name->ino == audit_watch_inode(rule->watch));
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400554 break;
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -0400555 case AUDIT_DIR:
556 if (ctx)
557 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
558 break;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700559 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
560 result = 0;
561 if (ctx)
Al Virobfef93a2008-01-10 04:53:18 -0500562 result = audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700563 break;
Darrel Goeddel3a6b9f82006-06-29 16:56:39 -0500564 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
565 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
566 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
567 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
568 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
Darrel Goeddel3dc7e312006-03-10 18:14:06 -0600569 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
570 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
571 match for now to avoid losing information that
572 may be wanted. An error message will also be
573 logged upon error */
Ahmed S. Darwish04305e42008-04-19 09:59:43 +1000574 if (f->lsm_rule) {
Steve Grubb2ad312d2006-04-11 08:50:56 -0400575 if (need_sid) {
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +0200576 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
Steve Grubb2ad312d2006-04-11 08:50:56 -0400577 need_sid = 0;
578 }
Ahmed S. Darwishd7a96f32008-03-01 22:01:11 +0200579 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
Darrel Goeddel3dc7e312006-03-10 18:14:06 -0600580 f->op,
Ahmed S. Darwish04305e42008-04-19 09:59:43 +1000581 f->lsm_rule,
Darrel Goeddel3dc7e312006-03-10 18:14:06 -0600582 ctx);
Steve Grubb2ad312d2006-04-11 08:50:56 -0400583 }
Darrel Goeddel3dc7e312006-03-10 18:14:06 -0600584 break;
Darrel Goeddel6e5a2d12006-06-29 16:57:08 -0500585 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
586 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
587 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
588 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
589 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
590 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
591 also applies here */
Ahmed S. Darwish04305e42008-04-19 09:59:43 +1000592 if (f->lsm_rule) {
Darrel Goeddel6e5a2d12006-06-29 16:57:08 -0500593 /* Find files that match */
594 if (name) {
Ahmed S. Darwishd7a96f32008-03-01 22:01:11 +0200595 result = security_audit_rule_match(
Darrel Goeddel6e5a2d12006-06-29 16:57:08 -0500596 name->osid, f->type, f->op,
Ahmed S. Darwish04305e42008-04-19 09:59:43 +1000597 f->lsm_rule, ctx);
Darrel Goeddel6e5a2d12006-06-29 16:57:08 -0500598 } else if (ctx) {
599 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
Ahmed S. Darwishd7a96f32008-03-01 22:01:11 +0200600 if (security_audit_rule_match(
Darrel Goeddel6e5a2d12006-06-29 16:57:08 -0500601 ctx->names[j].osid,
602 f->type, f->op,
Ahmed S. Darwish04305e42008-04-19 09:59:43 +1000603 f->lsm_rule, ctx)) {
Darrel Goeddel6e5a2d12006-06-29 16:57:08 -0500604 ++result;
605 break;
606 }
607 }
608 }
609 /* Find ipc objects that match */
Al Viroa33e6752008-12-10 03:40:06 -0500610 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
611 break;
612 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
613 f->type, f->op,
614 f->lsm_rule, ctx))
615 ++result;
Darrel Goeddel6e5a2d12006-06-29 16:57:08 -0500616 }
617 break;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700618 case AUDIT_ARG0:
619 case AUDIT_ARG1:
620 case AUDIT_ARG2:
621 case AUDIT_ARG3:
622 if (ctx)
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500623 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700624 break;
Amy Griffis5adc8a62006-06-14 18:45:21 -0400625 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
626 /* ignore this field for filtering */
627 result = 1;
628 break;
Al Viro55669bf2006-08-31 19:26:40 -0400629 case AUDIT_PERM:
630 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
631 break;
Al Viro8b67dca2008-04-28 04:15:49 -0400632 case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
633 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
634 break;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700635 }
636
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +1100637 if (!result) {
638 put_cred(cred);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700639 return 0;
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +1100640 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700641 }
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500642
643 if (ctx) {
644 if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
645 return 0;
646 if (rule->filterkey) {
647 kfree(ctx->filterkey);
648 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
649 }
650 ctx->prio = rule->prio;
651 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700652 switch (rule->action) {
653 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700654 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
655 }
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +1100656 put_cred(cred);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700657 return 1;
658}
659
660/* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
661 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
662 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
663 */
Al Viroe048e022008-12-16 03:51:22 -0500664static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700665{
666 struct audit_entry *e;
667 enum audit_state state;
668
669 rcu_read_lock();
David Woodhouse0f45aa12005-06-19 19:35:50 +0100670 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400671 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state)) {
Al Viroe048e022008-12-16 03:51:22 -0500672 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
673 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700674 rcu_read_unlock();
675 return state;
676 }
677 }
678 rcu_read_unlock();
679 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
680}
681
682/* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
683 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
Steve Grubb23f32d12005-05-13 18:35:15 +0100684 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -0700685 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700686 */
687static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
688 struct audit_context *ctx,
689 struct list_head *list)
690{
691 struct audit_entry *e;
David Woodhousec3896492005-08-17 14:49:57 +0100692 enum audit_state state;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700693
David Woodhouse351bb722005-07-14 14:40:06 +0100694 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
David Woodhousef7056d62005-06-20 16:07:33 +0100695 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
696
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700697 rcu_read_lock();
David Woodhousec3896492005-08-17 14:49:57 +0100698 if (!list_empty(list)) {
Dustin Kirklandb63862f2005-11-03 15:41:46 +0000699 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
700 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
David Woodhousec3896492005-08-17 14:49:57 +0100701
Dustin Kirklandb63862f2005-11-03 15:41:46 +0000702 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400703 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
704 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
705 &state)) {
Dustin Kirklandb63862f2005-11-03 15:41:46 +0000706 rcu_read_unlock();
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500707 ctx->current_state = state;
Dustin Kirklandb63862f2005-11-03 15:41:46 +0000708 return state;
709 }
710 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700711 }
712 rcu_read_unlock();
713 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
714}
715
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400716/* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names[] have been
717 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
718 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names[].
719 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
720 */
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500721void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400722{
723 int i;
724 struct audit_entry *e;
725 enum audit_state state;
726
727 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500728 return;
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400729
730 rcu_read_lock();
731 for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) {
732 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
733 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
734 struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i];
735 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
736 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
737
738 if (list_empty(list))
739 continue;
740
741 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
742 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
743 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) {
744 rcu_read_unlock();
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500745 ctx->current_state = state;
746 return;
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400747 }
748 }
749 }
750 rcu_read_unlock();
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400751}
752
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700753static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
754 int return_valid,
Paul Moore6d208da2009-04-01 15:47:27 -0400755 long return_code)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700756{
757 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
758
759 if (likely(!context))
760 return NULL;
761 context->return_valid = return_valid;
Eric Parisf701b752008-01-07 13:34:51 -0500762
763 /*
764 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
765 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
766 * signal handlers
767 *
768 * This is actually a test for:
769 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
770 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
771 *
772 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
773 */
774 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
775 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
776 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
777 context->return_code = -EINTR;
778 else
779 context->return_code = return_code;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700780
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500781 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy) {
782 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
783 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700784 }
785
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700786 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
787 return context;
788}
789
790static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
791{
792 int i;
793
794#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500795 if (context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +0000796 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700797 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
798 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +0000799 __FILE__, __LINE__,
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700800 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
801 context->name_count, context->put_count,
802 context->ino_count);
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +0000803 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700804 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
805 context->names[i].name,
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +0000806 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +0000807 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700808 dump_stack();
809 return;
810 }
811#endif
812#if AUDIT_DEBUG
813 context->put_count = 0;
814 context->ino_count = 0;
815#endif
816
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +0000817 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -0400818 if (context->names[i].name && context->names[i].name_put)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700819 __putname(context->names[i].name);
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +0000820 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700821 context->name_count = 0;
Jan Blunck44707fd2008-02-14 19:38:33 -0800822 path_put(&context->pwd);
823 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
824 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700825}
826
827static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
828{
829 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
830
831 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
832 context->aux = aux->next;
833 kfree(aux);
834 }
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400835 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
836 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
837 kfree(aux);
838 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700839}
840
841static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
842 enum audit_state state)
843{
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700844 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
845 context->state = state;
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500846 context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700847}
848
849static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
850{
851 struct audit_context *context;
852
853 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
854 return NULL;
855 audit_zero_context(context, state);
Al Viro916d7572009-06-24 00:02:38 -0400856 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700857 return context;
858}
859
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -0700860/**
861 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
862 * @tsk: task
863 *
864 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700865 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
866 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -0700867 * needed.
868 */
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700869int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
870{
871 struct audit_context *context;
872 enum audit_state state;
Al Viroe048e022008-12-16 03:51:22 -0500873 char *key = NULL;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700874
Eric Parisb593d382008-01-08 17:38:31 -0500875 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700876 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
877
Al Viroe048e022008-12-16 03:51:22 -0500878 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700879 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
880 return 0;
881
882 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
Al Viroe048e022008-12-16 03:51:22 -0500883 kfree(key);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700884 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
885 return -ENOMEM;
886 }
Al Viroe048e022008-12-16 03:51:22 -0500887 context->filterkey = key;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700888
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700889 tsk->audit_context = context;
890 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
891 return 0;
892}
893
894static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
895{
896 struct audit_context *previous;
897 int count = 0;
898
899 do {
900 previous = context->previous;
901 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
902 ++count;
903 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
904 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
905 context->serial, context->major,
906 context->name_count, count);
907 }
908 audit_free_names(context);
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -0400909 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
910 free_tree_refs(context);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700911 audit_free_aux(context);
Amy Griffis5adc8a62006-06-14 18:45:21 -0400912 kfree(context->filterkey);
Al Viro4f6b4342008-12-09 19:50:34 -0500913 kfree(context->sockaddr);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700914 kfree(context);
915 context = previous;
916 } while (context);
917 if (count >= 10)
918 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
919}
920
Joy Latten161a09e2006-11-27 13:11:54 -0600921void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +0000922{
923 char *ctx = NULL;
Al Viroc4823bc2007-03-12 16:17:42 +0000924 unsigned len;
925 int error;
926 u32 sid;
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +0000927
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +0200928 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
Al Viroc4823bc2007-03-12 16:17:42 +0000929 if (!sid)
930 return;
931
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +0200932 error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
Al Viroc4823bc2007-03-12 16:17:42 +0000933 if (error) {
934 if (error != -EINVAL)
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +0000935 goto error_path;
936 return;
937 }
938
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +0000939 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +0200940 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
Dustin Kirkland7306a0b2005-11-16 15:53:13 +0000941 return;
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +0000942
943error_path:
Dustin Kirkland7306a0b2005-11-16 15:53:13 +0000944 audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +0000945 return;
946}
947
Joy Latten161a09e2006-11-27 13:11:54 -0600948EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
949
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -0500950static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
Stephen Smalley219f0812005-04-18 10:47:35 -0700951{
Al Viro45d9bb02006-03-29 20:02:55 -0500952 char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
953 struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
Stephen Smalley219f0812005-04-18 10:47:35 -0700954 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
955
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -0500956 /* tsk == current */
957
Al Viro45d9bb02006-03-29 20:02:55 -0500958 get_task_comm(name, tsk);
David Woodhouse99e45ee2005-05-23 21:57:41 +0100959 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
960 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
Stephen Smalley219f0812005-04-18 10:47:35 -0700961
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -0500962 if (mm) {
963 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
964 vma = mm->mmap;
965 while (vma) {
966 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
967 vma->vm_file) {
968 audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
Jan Blunck44707fd2008-02-14 19:38:33 -0800969 &vma->vm_file->f_path);
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -0500970 break;
971 }
972 vma = vma->vm_next;
Stephen Smalley219f0812005-04-18 10:47:35 -0700973 }
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -0500974 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
Stephen Smalley219f0812005-04-18 10:47:35 -0700975 }
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -0500976 audit_log_task_context(ab);
Stephen Smalley219f0812005-04-18 10:47:35 -0700977}
978
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400979static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -0500980 uid_t auid, uid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
981 u32 sid, char *comm)
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400982{
983 struct audit_buffer *ab;
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +0200984 char *ctx = NULL;
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400985 u32 len;
986 int rc = 0;
987
988 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
989 if (!ab)
Eric Paris6246cca2008-01-07 14:01:18 -0500990 return rc;
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400991
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -0500992 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid,
993 uid, sessionid);
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +0200994 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -0500995 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400996 rc = 1;
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +0200997 } else {
998 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
999 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1000 }
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05001001 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
1002 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04001003 audit_log_end(ab);
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04001004
1005 return rc;
1006}
1007
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001008/*
1009 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
1010 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
1011 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundry)
1012 *
1013 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
1014 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
1015 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
1016 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
1017 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
1018 */
1019static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context,
1020 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1021 int arg_num,
1022 size_t *len_sent,
1023 const char __user *p,
1024 char *buf)
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07001025{
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001026 char arg_num_len_buf[12];
1027 const char __user *tmp_p = p;
Eric Parisb87ce6e2009-06-11 14:31:34 -04001028 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 5 is the length of ' a=""' */
1029 size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 5;
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001030 size_t len, len_left, to_send;
1031 size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1032 unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0;
1033 int ret;
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07001034
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001035 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
1036 len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07001037
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001038 /*
1039 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
1040 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
1041 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
1042 * any.
1043 */
Eric Parisb0abcfc2008-02-18 18:23:16 -05001044 if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001045 WARN_ON(1);
1046 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
Eric Parisb0abcfc2008-02-18 18:23:16 -05001047 return -1;
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001048 }
Peter Zijlstra040b3a22007-07-28 00:55:18 +02001049
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001050 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
1051 do {
1052 if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN)
1053 to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1054 else
1055 to_send = len_left;
1056 ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send);
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07001057 /*
1058 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
1059 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
1060 * space yet.
1061 */
Peter Zijlstra040b3a22007-07-28 00:55:18 +02001062 if (ret) {
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07001063 WARN_ON(1);
1064 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
Eric Parisb0abcfc2008-02-18 18:23:16 -05001065 return -1;
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07001066 }
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001067 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1068 has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send);
1069 if (has_cntl) {
1070 /*
1071 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
1072 * send half as much in each message
1073 */
1074 max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2;
1075 break;
1076 }
1077 len_left -= to_send;
1078 tmp_p += to_send;
1079 } while (len_left > 0);
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07001080
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001081 len_left = len;
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07001082
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001083 if (len > max_execve_audit_len)
1084 too_long = 1;
1085
1086 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
1087 for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) {
1088 int room_left;
1089
1090 if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len)
1091 to_send = max_execve_audit_len;
1092 else
1093 to_send = len_left;
1094
1095 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
1096 room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent;
1097 if (has_cntl)
1098 room_left -= (to_send * 2);
1099 else
1100 room_left -= to_send;
1101 if (room_left < 0) {
1102 *len_sent = 0;
1103 audit_log_end(*ab);
1104 *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1105 if (!*ab)
1106 return 0;
1107 }
1108
1109 /*
1110 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
1111 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
1112 */
1113 if ((i == 0) && (too_long))
Jiri Pirkoca96a892009-01-09 16:44:16 +01001114 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d_len=%zu", arg_num,
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001115 has_cntl ? 2*len : len);
1116
1117 /*
1118 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
1119 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
1120 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
1121 */
1122 if (len >= max_execve_audit_len)
1123 ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send);
1124 else
1125 ret = 0;
1126 if (ret) {
1127 WARN_ON(1);
1128 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
Eric Parisb0abcfc2008-02-18 18:23:16 -05001129 return -1;
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001130 }
1131 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1132
1133 /* actually log it */
Jiri Pirkoca96a892009-01-09 16:44:16 +01001134 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d", arg_num);
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001135 if (too_long)
1136 audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i);
1137 audit_log_format(*ab, "=");
1138 if (has_cntl)
Eric Parisb556f8a2008-04-18 10:12:59 -04001139 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send);
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001140 else
Eric Paris9d960982009-06-11 14:31:37 -04001141 audit_log_string(*ab, buf);
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001142
1143 p += to_send;
1144 len_left -= to_send;
1145 *len_sent += arg_num_len;
1146 if (has_cntl)
1147 *len_sent += to_send * 2;
1148 else
1149 *len_sent += to_send;
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07001150 }
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001151 /* include the null we didn't log */
1152 return len + 1;
1153}
1154
1155static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1156 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1157 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi)
1158{
1159 int i;
1160 size_t len, len_sent = 0;
1161 const char __user *p;
1162 char *buf;
1163
1164 if (axi->mm != current->mm)
1165 return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
1166
1167 p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start;
1168
Jiri Pirkoca96a892009-01-09 16:44:16 +01001169 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", axi->argc);
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001170
1171 /*
1172 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
1173 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
1174 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
1175 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
1176 */
1177 buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1178 if (!buf) {
1179 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
1180 return;
1181 }
1182
1183 for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++) {
1184 len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
1185 &len_sent, p, buf);
1186 if (len <= 0)
1187 break;
1188 p += len;
1189 }
1190 kfree(buf);
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07001191}
1192
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +11001193static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
1194{
1195 int i;
1196
1197 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
1198 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
1199 audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]);
1200 }
1201}
1202
1203static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
1204{
1205 kernel_cap_t *perm = &name->fcap.permitted;
1206 kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable;
1207 int log = 0;
1208
1209 if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) {
1210 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm);
1211 log = 1;
1212 }
1213 if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) {
1214 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh);
1215 log = 1;
1216 }
1217
1218 if (log)
1219 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x", name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver);
1220}
1221
Al Viroa33e6752008-12-10 03:40:06 -05001222static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -05001223{
1224 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1225 int i;
1226
1227 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1228 if (!ab)
1229 return;
1230
1231 switch (context->type) {
1232 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1233 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1234 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1235 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1236 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1237 context->socketcall.args[i]);
1238 break; }
Al Viroa33e6752008-12-10 03:40:06 -05001239 case AUDIT_IPC: {
1240 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
1241
1242 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
1243 context->ipc.uid, context->ipc.gid, context->ipc.mode);
1244 if (osid) {
1245 char *ctx = NULL;
1246 u32 len;
1247 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1248 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
1249 *call_panic = 1;
1250 } else {
1251 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1252 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1253 }
1254 }
Al Viroe816f372008-12-10 03:47:15 -05001255 if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1256 audit_log_end(ab);
1257 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1258 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1259 audit_log_format(ab,
1260 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
1261 context->ipc.qbytes,
1262 context->ipc.perm_uid,
1263 context->ipc.perm_gid,
1264 context->ipc.perm_mode);
1265 if (!ab)
1266 return;
1267 }
Al Viroa33e6752008-12-10 03:40:06 -05001268 break; }
Al Viro564f6992008-12-14 04:02:26 -05001269 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
1270 audit_log_format(ab,
1271 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#o mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1272 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1273 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
1274 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
1275 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
1276 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
1277 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
1278 break; }
Al Viroc32c8af2008-12-14 03:46:48 -05001279 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
1280 audit_log_format(ab,
1281 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1282 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1283 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
1284 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
1285 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
1286 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
1287 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1288 break; }
Al Viro20114f72008-12-10 07:16:12 -05001289 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
1290 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1291 context->mq_notify.mqdes,
1292 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
1293 break; }
Al Viro73929062008-12-10 06:58:59 -05001294 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1295 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
1296 audit_log_format(ab,
1297 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1298 "mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
1299 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
1300 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
1301 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
1302 break; }
Al Viro57f71a02009-01-04 14:52:57 -05001303 case AUDIT_CAPSET: {
1304 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
1305 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
1306 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
1307 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
1308 break; }
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -05001309 }
1310 audit_log_end(ab);
1311}
1312
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -05001313static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001314{
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +11001315 const struct cred *cred;
Steve Grubb9c7aa6a2006-03-31 15:22:49 -05001316 int i, call_panic = 0;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001317 struct audit_buffer *ab;
David Woodhouse7551ced2005-05-26 12:04:57 +01001318 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
Steve Grubba6c043a2006-01-01 14:07:00 -05001319 const char *tty;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001320
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -05001321 /* tsk == current */
Al Viro3f2792f2006-07-16 06:43:48 -04001322 context->pid = tsk->pid;
Alexander Viro419c58f2006-09-29 00:08:50 -04001323 if (!context->ppid)
1324 context->ppid = sys_getppid();
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +11001325 cred = current_cred();
1326 context->uid = cred->uid;
1327 context->gid = cred->gid;
1328 context->euid = cred->euid;
1329 context->suid = cred->suid;
David Howellsb6dff3e2008-11-14 10:39:16 +11001330 context->fsuid = cred->fsuid;
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +11001331 context->egid = cred->egid;
1332 context->sgid = cred->sgid;
David Howellsb6dff3e2008-11-14 10:39:16 +11001333 context->fsgid = cred->fsgid;
Al Viro3f2792f2006-07-16 06:43:48 -04001334 context->personality = tsk->personality;
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -05001335
1336 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001337 if (!ab)
1338 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
David Woodhousebccf6ae2005-05-23 21:35:28 +01001339 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1340 context->arch, context->major);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001341 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1342 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1343 if (context->return_valid)
Daniel Walker9f8dbe92007-10-18 03:06:09 -07001344 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
2fd6f582005-04-29 16:08:28 +01001345 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1346 context->return_code);
Alan Coxeb84a202006-09-29 02:01:41 -07001347
Alan Coxdbda4c02008-10-13 10:40:53 +01001348 spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
Al Viro45d9bb02006-03-29 20:02:55 -05001349 if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
1350 tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
Steve Grubba6c043a2006-01-01 14:07:00 -05001351 else
1352 tty = "(none)";
Alan Coxdbda4c02008-10-13 10:40:53 +01001353 spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
1354
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001355 audit_log_format(ab,
1356 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
Al Virof46038f2006-05-06 08:22:52 -04001357 " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
Steve Grubb326e9c82005-05-21 00:22:31 +01001358 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05001359 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001360 context->argv[0],
1361 context->argv[1],
1362 context->argv[2],
1363 context->argv[3],
1364 context->name_count,
Al Virof46038f2006-05-06 08:22:52 -04001365 context->ppid,
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001366 context->pid,
Al Virobfef93a2008-01-10 04:53:18 -05001367 tsk->loginuid,
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001368 context->uid,
1369 context->gid,
1370 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05001371 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty,
1372 tsk->sessionid);
Alan Coxeb84a202006-09-29 02:01:41 -07001373
Alan Coxeb84a202006-09-29 02:01:41 -07001374
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -05001375 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
Eric Paris9d960982009-06-11 14:31:37 -04001376 audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001377 audit_log_end(ab);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001378
David Woodhouse7551ced2005-05-26 12:04:57 +01001379 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
Steve Grubbc0404992005-05-13 18:17:42 +01001380
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -05001381 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001382 if (!ab)
1383 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1384
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001385 switch (aux->type) {
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05001386
Al Viro473ae302006-04-26 14:04:08 -04001387 case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
1388 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001389 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab, axi);
Al Viro473ae302006-04-26 14:04:08 -04001390 break; }
Steve Grubb073115d2006-04-02 17:07:33 -04001391
Eric Paris3fc689e2008-11-11 21:48:18 +11001392 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1393 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1394 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1395 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1396 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1397 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1398 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1399 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1400 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1401 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1402 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1403 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1404 break; }
1405
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001406 }
1407 audit_log_end(ab);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001408 }
1409
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -05001410 if (context->type)
Al Viroa33e6752008-12-10 03:40:06 -05001411 show_special(context, &call_panic);
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -05001412
Al Viro157cf642008-12-14 04:57:47 -05001413 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
1414 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
1415 if (ab) {
1416 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1417 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
1418 audit_log_end(ab);
1419 }
1420 }
1421
Al Viro4f6b4342008-12-09 19:50:34 -05001422 if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1423 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1424 if (ab) {
1425 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1426 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1427 context->sockaddr_len);
1428 audit_log_end(ab);
1429 }
1430 }
1431
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04001432 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1433 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04001434
1435 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1436 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05001437 axs->target_auid[i],
1438 axs->target_uid[i],
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05001439 axs->target_sessionid[i],
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05001440 axs->target_sid[i],
1441 axs->target_comm[i]))
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04001442 call_panic = 1;
Al Viroa5cb0132007-03-20 13:58:35 -04001443 }
1444
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04001445 if (context->target_pid &&
1446 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05001447 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05001448 context->target_sessionid,
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05001449 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04001450 call_panic = 1;
1451
Jan Blunck44707fd2008-02-14 19:38:33 -08001452 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -05001453 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
David Woodhouse8f37d472005-05-27 12:17:28 +01001454 if (ab) {
Jan Blunck44707fd2008-02-14 19:38:33 -08001455 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
David Woodhouse8f37d472005-05-27 12:17:28 +01001456 audit_log_end(ab);
1457 }
1458 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001459 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -04001460 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[i];
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00001461
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -05001462 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001463 if (!ab)
1464 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
David Woodhouse8f37d472005-05-27 12:17:28 +01001465
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001466 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00001467
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -04001468 if (n->name) {
1469 switch(n->name_len) {
1470 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
1471 /* log the full path */
1472 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1473 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name);
1474 break;
1475 case 0:
1476 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1477 * directory component is the cwd */
Eric Parisdef57542009-03-10 18:00:14 -04001478 audit_log_d_path(ab, "name=", &context->pwd);
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -04001479 break;
1480 default:
1481 /* log the name's directory component */
1482 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
Eric Parisb556f8a2008-04-18 10:12:59 -04001483 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name,
1484 n->name_len);
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -04001485 }
1486 } else
1487 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00001488
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -04001489 if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) {
1490 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
1491 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
1492 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1493 n->ino,
1494 MAJOR(n->dev),
1495 MINOR(n->dev),
1496 n->mode,
1497 n->uid,
1498 n->gid,
1499 MAJOR(n->rdev),
1500 MINOR(n->rdev));
1501 }
1502 if (n->osid != 0) {
Steve Grubb1b50eed2006-04-03 14:06:13 -04001503 char *ctx = NULL;
1504 u32 len;
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02001505 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -04001506 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1507 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
Steve Grubb9c7aa6a2006-03-31 15:22:49 -05001508 call_panic = 2;
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02001509 } else {
Steve Grubb1b50eed2006-04-03 14:06:13 -04001510 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02001511 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1512 }
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +00001513 }
1514
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +11001515 audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
1516
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001517 audit_log_end(ab);
1518 }
Eric Parisc0641f22008-01-07 13:49:15 -05001519
1520 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1521 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1522 if (ab)
1523 audit_log_end(ab);
Steve Grubb9c7aa6a2006-03-31 15:22:49 -05001524 if (call_panic)
1525 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001526}
1527
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001528/**
1529 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1530 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1531 *
Al Virofa84cb92006-03-29 20:30:19 -05001532 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001533 */
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001534void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1535{
1536 struct audit_context *context;
1537
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001538 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001539 if (likely(!context))
1540 return;
1541
1542 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
Daniel Walker9f8dbe92007-10-18 03:06:09 -07001543 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1544 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
David Woodhousef5561962005-07-13 22:47:07 +01001545 * in the context of the idle thread */
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -05001546 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -05001547 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -05001548 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
Al Viro916d7572009-06-24 00:02:38 -04001549 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1550 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001551
1552 audit_free_context(context);
1553}
1554
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001555/**
1556 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001557 * @arch: architecture type
1558 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1559 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1560 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1561 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1562 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1563 *
1564 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001565 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1566 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1567 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1568 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1569 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001570 * be written).
1571 */
Al Viro5411be52006-03-29 20:23:36 -05001572void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001573 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1574 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1575{
Al Viro5411be52006-03-29 20:23:36 -05001576 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001577 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1578 enum audit_state state;
1579
Roland McGrath86a1c342008-06-23 15:37:04 -07001580 if (unlikely(!context))
1581 return;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001582
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001583 /*
1584 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001585 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
1586 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
1587 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
1588 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
1589 *
1590 * i386 no
1591 * x86_64 no
Jon Mason2ef94812006-01-23 10:58:20 -06001592 * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001593 *
1594 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
1595 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
1596 */
1597 if (context->in_syscall) {
1598 struct audit_context *newctx;
1599
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001600#if AUDIT_DEBUG
1601 printk(KERN_ERR
1602 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
1603 " entering syscall=%d\n",
1604 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
1605#endif
1606 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
1607 if (newctx) {
1608 newctx->previous = context;
1609 context = newctx;
1610 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
1611 } else {
1612 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
1613 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
1614 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
1615 * to abandon auditing. */
1616 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
1617 }
1618 }
1619 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1620
1621 if (!audit_enabled)
1622 return;
1623
2fd6f582005-04-29 16:08:28 +01001624 context->arch = arch;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001625 context->major = major;
1626 context->argv[0] = a1;
1627 context->argv[1] = a2;
1628 context->argv[2] = a3;
1629 context->argv[3] = a4;
1630
1631 state = context->state;
Al Virod51374a2006-08-03 10:59:26 -04001632 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -05001633 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
1634 context->prio = 0;
David Woodhouse0f45aa12005-06-19 19:35:50 +01001635 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -05001636 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001637 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
1638 return;
1639
David Woodhousece625a82005-07-18 14:24:46 -04001640 context->serial = 0;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001641 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1642 context->in_syscall = 1;
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -05001643 context->current_state = state;
Alexander Viro419c58f2006-09-29 00:08:50 -04001644 context->ppid = 0;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001645}
1646
Al Viroa64e6492008-11-12 18:37:41 -05001647void audit_finish_fork(struct task_struct *child)
1648{
1649 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
1650 struct audit_context *p = child->audit_context;
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -05001651 if (!p || !ctx)
1652 return;
1653 if (!ctx->in_syscall || ctx->current_state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
Al Viroa64e6492008-11-12 18:37:41 -05001654 return;
1655 p->arch = ctx->arch;
1656 p->major = ctx->major;
1657 memcpy(p->argv, ctx->argv, sizeof(ctx->argv));
1658 p->ctime = ctx->ctime;
1659 p->dummy = ctx->dummy;
Al Viroa64e6492008-11-12 18:37:41 -05001660 p->in_syscall = ctx->in_syscall;
1661 p->filterkey = kstrdup(ctx->filterkey, GFP_KERNEL);
1662 p->ppid = current->pid;
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -05001663 p->prio = ctx->prio;
1664 p->current_state = ctx->current_state;
Al Viroa64e6492008-11-12 18:37:41 -05001665}
1666
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001667/**
1668 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001669 * @valid: success/failure flag
1670 * @return_code: syscall return value
1671 *
1672 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001673 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1674 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
1675 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001676 * free the names stored from getname().
1677 */
Al Viro5411be52006-03-29 20:23:36 -05001678void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001679{
Al Viro5411be52006-03-29 20:23:36 -05001680 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001681 struct audit_context *context;
1682
2fd6f582005-04-29 16:08:28 +01001683 context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001684
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001685 if (likely(!context))
Al Viro97e94c42006-03-29 20:26:24 -05001686 return;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001687
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -05001688 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -05001689 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001690
1691 context->in_syscall = 0;
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -05001692 context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
2fd6f582005-04-29 16:08:28 +01001693
Al Viro916d7572009-06-24 00:02:38 -04001694 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1695 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
1696
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001697 if (context->previous) {
1698 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
1699 context->previous = NULL;
1700 audit_free_context(context);
1701 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
1702 } else {
1703 audit_free_names(context);
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -04001704 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001705 audit_free_aux(context);
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04001706 context->aux = NULL;
1707 context->aux_pids = NULL;
Al Viroa5cb0132007-03-20 13:58:35 -04001708 context->target_pid = 0;
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04001709 context->target_sid = 0;
Al Viro4f6b4342008-12-09 19:50:34 -05001710 context->sockaddr_len = 0;
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -05001711 context->type = 0;
Al Viro157cf642008-12-14 04:57:47 -05001712 context->fds[0] = -1;
Al Viroe048e022008-12-16 03:51:22 -05001713 if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
1714 kfree(context->filterkey);
1715 context->filterkey = NULL;
1716 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001717 tsk->audit_context = context;
1718 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001719}
1720
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -04001721static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1722{
1723#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1724 struct audit_context *context;
1725 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1726 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1727 int count;
1728 if (likely(list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches)))
1729 return;
1730 context = current->audit_context;
1731 p = context->trees;
1732 count = context->tree_count;
1733 rcu_read_lock();
1734 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1735 rcu_read_unlock();
1736 if (!chunk)
1737 return;
1738 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1739 return;
1740 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
Eric Paris436c4052008-04-18 10:01:04 -04001741 printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -04001742 audit_set_auditable(context);
1743 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1744 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1745 return;
1746 }
1747 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1748#endif
1749}
1750
1751static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1752{
1753#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1754 struct audit_context *context;
1755 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1756 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1757 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1758 unsigned long seq;
1759 int count;
1760
1761 context = current->audit_context;
1762 p = context->trees;
1763 count = context->tree_count;
1764retry:
1765 drop = NULL;
1766 d = dentry;
1767 rcu_read_lock();
1768 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1769 for(;;) {
1770 struct inode *inode = d->d_inode;
1771 if (inode && unlikely(!list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches))) {
1772 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1773 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1774 if (chunk) {
1775 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1776 drop = chunk;
1777 break;
1778 }
1779 }
1780 }
1781 parent = d->d_parent;
1782 if (parent == d)
1783 break;
1784 d = parent;
1785 }
1786 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1787 rcu_read_unlock();
1788 if (!drop) {
1789 /* just a race with rename */
1790 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1791 goto retry;
1792 }
1793 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1794 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1795 /* OK, got more space */
1796 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1797 goto retry;
1798 }
1799 /* too bad */
1800 printk(KERN_WARNING
Eric Paris436c4052008-04-18 10:01:04 -04001801 "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -04001802 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1803 audit_set_auditable(context);
1804 return;
1805 }
1806 rcu_read_unlock();
1807#endif
1808}
1809
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001810/**
1811 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1812 * @name: name to add
1813 *
1814 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1815 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1816 */
Al Virod8945bb52006-05-18 16:01:30 -04001817void __audit_getname(const char *name)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001818{
1819 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1820
Al Virod8945bb52006-05-18 16:01:30 -04001821 if (IS_ERR(name) || !name)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001822 return;
1823
1824 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1825#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1826 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1827 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1828 dump_stack();
1829#endif
1830 return;
1831 }
1832 BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
1833 context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -04001834 context->names[context->name_count].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1835 context->names[context->name_count].name_put = 1;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001836 context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
Amy Griffise41e8bd2007-02-13 14:14:09 -05001837 context->names[context->name_count].osid = 0;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001838 ++context->name_count;
Jan Blunck44707fd2008-02-14 19:38:33 -08001839 if (!context->pwd.dentry) {
David Woodhouse8f37d472005-05-27 12:17:28 +01001840 read_lock(&current->fs->lock);
Jan Blunck44707fd2008-02-14 19:38:33 -08001841 context->pwd = current->fs->pwd;
1842 path_get(&current->fs->pwd);
David Woodhouse8f37d472005-05-27 12:17:28 +01001843 read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
1844 }
Daniel Walker9f8dbe92007-10-18 03:06:09 -07001845
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001846}
1847
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001848/* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
1849 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
1850 *
1851 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
1852 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
1853 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
1854 */
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001855void audit_putname(const char *name)
1856{
1857 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1858
1859 BUG_ON(!context);
1860 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1861#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1862 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
1863 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1864 if (context->name_count) {
1865 int i;
1866 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
1867 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
1868 context->names[i].name,
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00001869 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001870 }
1871#endif
1872 __putname(name);
1873 }
1874#if AUDIT_DEBUG
1875 else {
1876 ++context->put_count;
1877 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
1878 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
1879 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
1880 " put_count=%d\n",
1881 __FILE__, __LINE__,
1882 context->serial, context->major,
1883 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
1884 context->put_count);
1885 dump_stack();
1886 }
1887 }
1888#endif
1889}
1890
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05001891static int audit_inc_name_count(struct audit_context *context,
1892 const struct inode *inode)
1893{
1894 if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES) {
1895 if (inode)
1896 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data: "
Eric Paris436c4052008-04-18 10:01:04 -04001897 "dev=%02x:%02x, inode=%lu\n",
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05001898 MAJOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
1899 MINOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
1900 inode->i_ino);
1901
1902 else
Eric Paris436c4052008-04-18 10:01:04 -04001903 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data\n");
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05001904 return 1;
1905 }
1906 context->name_count++;
1907#if AUDIT_DEBUG
1908 context->ino_count++;
1909#endif
1910 return 0;
1911}
1912
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +11001913
1914static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
1915{
1916 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
1917 int rc;
1918
1919 memset(&name->fcap.permitted, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t));
1920 memset(&name->fcap.inheritable, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t));
1921 name->fcap.fE = 0;
1922 name->fcap_ver = 0;
1923
1924 if (!dentry)
1925 return 0;
1926
1927 rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
1928 if (rc)
1929 return rc;
1930
1931 name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
1932 name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
1933 name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
1934 name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
1935
1936 return 0;
1937}
1938
1939
Amy Griffis3e2efce2006-07-13 13:16:02 -04001940/* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +11001941static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
1942 const struct inode *inode)
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +00001943{
Amy Griffis3e2efce2006-07-13 13:16:02 -04001944 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
1945 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1946 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
1947 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
1948 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
1949 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02001950 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +11001951 audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +00001952}
1953
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001954/**
1955 * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1956 * @name: name being audited
Randy Dunlap481968f2007-10-21 20:59:53 -07001957 * @dentry: dentry being audited
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001958 *
1959 * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
1960 */
Al Viro5a190ae2007-06-07 12:19:32 -04001961void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001962{
1963 int idx;
1964 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -04001965 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001966
1967 if (!context->in_syscall)
1968 return;
1969 if (context->name_count
1970 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name
1971 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
1972 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1973 else if (context->name_count > 1
1974 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name
1975 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
1976 idx = context->name_count - 2;
1977 else {
1978 /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
1979 * associated name? */
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05001980 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001981 return;
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05001982 idx = context->name_count - 1;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001983 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001984 }
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -04001985 handle_path(dentry);
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +11001986 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], dentry, inode);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001987}
1988
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00001989/**
1990 * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1991 * @dname: inode's dentry name
Randy Dunlap481968f2007-10-21 20:59:53 -07001992 * @dentry: dentry being audited
Amy Griffis73d3ec52006-07-13 13:16:39 -04001993 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00001994 *
1995 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1996 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1997 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1998 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1999 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
2000 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
2001 * unsuccessful attempts.
2002 */
Al Viro5a190ae2007-06-07 12:19:32 -04002003void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct dentry *dentry,
Amy Griffis73d3ec52006-07-13 13:16:39 -04002004 const struct inode *parent)
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00002005{
2006 int idx;
2007 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05002008 const char *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
Al Viro5a190ae2007-06-07 12:19:32 -04002009 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -04002010 int dirlen = 0;
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00002011
2012 if (!context->in_syscall)
2013 return;
2014
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -04002015 if (inode)
2016 handle_one(inode);
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00002017 /* determine matching parent */
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -04002018 if (!dname)
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05002019 goto add_names;
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00002020
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05002021 /* parent is more likely, look for it first */
2022 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
2023 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00002024
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05002025 if (!n->name)
2026 continue;
2027
2028 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino &&
2029 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
2030 n->name_len = dirlen; /* update parent data in place */
2031 found_parent = n->name;
2032 goto add_names;
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -04002033 }
Steve Grubbac9910c2006-09-28 14:31:32 -04002034 }
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00002035
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05002036 /* no matching parent, look for matching child */
2037 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
2038 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
Amy Griffis73d3ec52006-07-13 13:16:39 -04002039
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05002040 if (!n->name)
2041 continue;
2042
2043 /* strcmp() is the more likely scenario */
2044 if (!strcmp(dname, n->name) ||
2045 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
2046 if (inode)
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +11002047 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, inode);
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05002048 else
2049 n->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
2050 found_child = n->name;
2051 goto add_names;
Steve Grubbac9910c2006-09-28 14:31:32 -04002052 }
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05002053 }
2054
2055add_names:
2056 if (!found_parent) {
2057 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, parent))
2058 return;
2059 idx = context->name_count - 1;
2060 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +11002061 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, parent);
Amy Griffis73d3ec52006-07-13 13:16:39 -04002062 }
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05002063
2064 if (!found_child) {
2065 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
2066 return;
2067 idx = context->name_count - 1;
2068
2069 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
2070 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
2071 * audit_free_names() */
2072 if (found_parent) {
2073 context->names[idx].name = found_parent;
2074 context->names[idx].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2075 /* don't call __putname() */
2076 context->names[idx].name_put = 0;
2077 } else {
2078 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
2079 }
2080
2081 if (inode)
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +11002082 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, inode);
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05002083 else
2084 context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
2085 }
Amy Griffis3e2efce2006-07-13 13:16:02 -04002086}
Trond Myklebust50e437d2007-06-07 22:44:34 -04002087EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
Amy Griffis3e2efce2006-07-13 13:16:02 -04002088
2089/**
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002090 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2091 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2092 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
2093 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
2094 *
2095 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2096 */
Al Viro48887e62008-12-06 01:05:50 -05002097int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
David Woodhousebfb44962005-05-21 21:08:09 +01002098 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07002099{
Al Viro48887e62008-12-06 01:05:50 -05002100 if (!ctx->in_syscall)
2101 return 0;
David Woodhousece625a82005-07-18 14:24:46 -04002102 if (!ctx->serial)
2103 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
David Woodhousebfb44962005-05-21 21:08:09 +01002104 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
2105 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
2106 *serial = ctx->serial;
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -05002107 if (!ctx->prio) {
2108 ctx->prio = 1;
2109 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
2110 }
Al Viro48887e62008-12-06 01:05:50 -05002111 return 1;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07002112}
2113
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05002114/* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
2115static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
2116
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002117/**
2118 * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
2119 * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
2120 * @loginuid: loginuid value
2121 *
2122 * Returns 0.
2123 *
2124 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
2125 */
Steve Grubb456be6c2005-04-29 17:30:07 +01002126int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07002127{
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05002128 unsigned int sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
Steve Grubb41757102006-06-12 07:48:28 -04002129 struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
Steve Grubbc0404992005-05-13 18:17:42 +01002130
Al Virobfef93a2008-01-10 04:53:18 -05002131 if (context && context->in_syscall) {
2132 struct audit_buffer *ab;
Steve Grubb41757102006-06-12 07:48:28 -04002133
Al Virobfef93a2008-01-10 04:53:18 -05002134 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
2135 if (ab) {
2136 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05002137 "old auid=%u new auid=%u"
2138 " old ses=%u new ses=%u",
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +11002139 task->pid, task_uid(task),
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05002140 task->loginuid, loginuid,
2141 task->sessionid, sessionid);
Al Virobfef93a2008-01-10 04:53:18 -05002142 audit_log_end(ab);
Steve Grubbc0404992005-05-13 18:17:42 +01002143 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07002144 }
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05002145 task->sessionid = sessionid;
Al Virobfef93a2008-01-10 04:53:18 -05002146 task->loginuid = loginuid;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07002147 return 0;
2148}
2149
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002150/**
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002151 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2152 * @oflag: open flag
2153 * @mode: mode bits
Randy Dunlap6b962552009-01-05 13:41:13 -08002154 * @attr: queue attributes
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002155 *
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002156 */
Al Viro564f6992008-12-14 04:02:26 -05002157void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, mode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002158{
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002159 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2160
Al Viro564f6992008-12-14 04:02:26 -05002161 if (attr)
2162 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2163 else
2164 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002165
Al Viro564f6992008-12-14 04:02:26 -05002166 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
2167 context->mq_open.mode = mode;
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002168
Al Viro564f6992008-12-14 04:02:26 -05002169 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002170}
2171
2172/**
Al Viroc32c8af2008-12-14 03:46:48 -05002173 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002174 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2175 * @msg_len: Message length
2176 * @msg_prio: Message priority
Al Viroc32c8af2008-12-14 03:46:48 -05002177 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002178 *
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002179 */
Al Viroc32c8af2008-12-14 03:46:48 -05002180void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2181 const struct timespec *abs_timeout)
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002182{
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002183 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
Al Viroc32c8af2008-12-14 03:46:48 -05002184 struct timespec *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002185
Al Viroc32c8af2008-12-14 03:46:48 -05002186 if (abs_timeout)
2187 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec));
2188 else
2189 memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct timespec));
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002190
Al Viroc32c8af2008-12-14 03:46:48 -05002191 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
2192 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
2193 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002194
Al Viroc32c8af2008-12-14 03:46:48 -05002195 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002196}
2197
2198/**
2199 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2200 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
Randy Dunlap6b962552009-01-05 13:41:13 -08002201 * @notification: Notification event
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002202 *
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002203 */
2204
Al Viro20114f72008-12-10 07:16:12 -05002205void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002206{
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002207 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2208
Al Viro20114f72008-12-10 07:16:12 -05002209 if (notification)
2210 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
2211 else
2212 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002213
Al Viro20114f72008-12-10 07:16:12 -05002214 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
2215 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002216}
2217
2218/**
2219 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2220 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2221 * @mqstat: MQ flags
2222 *
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002223 */
Al Viro73929062008-12-10 06:58:59 -05002224void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002225{
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002226 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
Al Viro73929062008-12-10 06:58:59 -05002227 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
2228 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
2229 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002230}
2231
2232/**
Steve Grubb073115d2006-04-02 17:07:33 -04002233 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2234 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2235 *
Steve Grubb073115d2006-04-02 17:07:33 -04002236 */
Al Viroa33e6752008-12-10 03:40:06 -05002237void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
Steve Grubb073115d2006-04-02 17:07:33 -04002238{
Steve Grubb073115d2006-04-02 17:07:33 -04002239 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
Al Viroa33e6752008-12-10 03:40:06 -05002240 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2241 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2242 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
Al Viroe816f372008-12-10 03:47:15 -05002243 context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
Al Viroa33e6752008-12-10 03:40:06 -05002244 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
2245 context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
Steve Grubb073115d2006-04-02 17:07:33 -04002246}
2247
2248/**
2249 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002250 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2251 * @uid: msgq user id
2252 * @gid: msgq group id
2253 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2254 *
Al Viroe816f372008-12-10 03:47:15 -05002255 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002256 */
Al Viroe816f372008-12-10 03:47:15 -05002257void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07002258{
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07002259 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2260
Al Viroe816f372008-12-10 03:47:15 -05002261 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2262 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2263 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2264 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2265 context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07002266}
Steve Grubbc2f0c7c2005-05-06 12:38:39 +01002267
Al Viro473ae302006-04-26 14:04:08 -04002268int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2269{
2270 struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
2271 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
Al Viro473ae302006-04-26 14:04:08 -04002272
Al Viro5ac3a9c2006-07-16 06:38:45 -04002273 if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
Al Viro473ae302006-04-26 14:04:08 -04002274 return 0;
2275
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07002276 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
Al Viro473ae302006-04-26 14:04:08 -04002277 if (!ax)
2278 return -ENOMEM;
2279
2280 ax->argc = bprm->argc;
2281 ax->envc = bprm->envc;
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07002282 ax->mm = bprm->mm;
Al Viro473ae302006-04-26 14:04:08 -04002283 ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2284 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2285 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2286 return 0;
2287}
2288
2289
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002290/**
2291 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2292 * @nargs: number of args
2293 * @args: args array
2294 *
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002295 */
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -05002296void audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
David Woodhouse3ec3b2f2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01002297{
David Woodhouse3ec3b2f2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01002298 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2299
Al Viro5ac3a9c2006-07-16 06:38:45 -04002300 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -05002301 return;
David Woodhouse3ec3b2f2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01002302
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -05002303 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2304 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2305 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
David Woodhouse3ec3b2f2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01002306}
2307
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002308/**
Al Virodb349502007-02-07 01:48:00 -05002309 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2310 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2311 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2312 *
Al Virodb349502007-02-07 01:48:00 -05002313 */
Al Viro157cf642008-12-14 04:57:47 -05002314void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
Al Virodb349502007-02-07 01:48:00 -05002315{
2316 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
Al Viro157cf642008-12-14 04:57:47 -05002317 context->fds[0] = fd1;
2318 context->fds[1] = fd2;
Al Virodb349502007-02-07 01:48:00 -05002319}
2320
2321/**
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002322 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2323 * @len: data length in user space
2324 * @a: data address in kernel space
2325 *
2326 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2327 */
David Woodhouse3ec3b2f2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01002328int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2329{
David Woodhouse3ec3b2f2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01002330 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2331
Al Viro5ac3a9c2006-07-16 06:38:45 -04002332 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
David Woodhouse3ec3b2f2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01002333 return 0;
2334
Al Viro4f6b4342008-12-09 19:50:34 -05002335 if (!context->sockaddr) {
2336 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2337 if (!p)
2338 return -ENOMEM;
2339 context->sockaddr = p;
2340 }
David Woodhouse3ec3b2f2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01002341
Al Viro4f6b4342008-12-09 19:50:34 -05002342 context->sockaddr_len = len;
2343 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
David Woodhouse3ec3b2f2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01002344 return 0;
2345}
2346
Al Viroa5cb0132007-03-20 13:58:35 -04002347void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2348{
2349 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2350
2351 context->target_pid = t->pid;
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05002352 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +11002353 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05002354 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02002355 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05002356 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
Al Viroa5cb0132007-03-20 13:58:35 -04002357}
2358
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002359/**
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002360 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2361 * @sig: signal value
2362 * @t: task being signaled
2363 *
2364 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2365 * and uid that is doing that.
2366 */
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04002367int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
Steve Grubbc2f0c7c2005-05-06 12:38:39 +01002368{
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04002369 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2370 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
2371 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +11002372 uid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t);
Steve Grubbc2f0c7c2005-05-06 12:38:39 +01002373
Al Viro175fc482007-08-08 00:01:46 +01002374 if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
Eric Parisee1d3152008-07-07 10:49:45 -04002375 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) {
Al Viro175fc482007-08-08 00:01:46 +01002376 audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
Al Virobfef93a2008-01-10 04:53:18 -05002377 if (tsk->loginuid != -1)
2378 audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
Al Viro175fc482007-08-08 00:01:46 +01002379 else
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +11002380 audit_sig_uid = uid;
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02002381 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
Al Viro175fc482007-08-08 00:01:46 +01002382 }
2383 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2384 return 0;
Steve Grubbc2f0c7c2005-05-06 12:38:39 +01002385 }
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04002386
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04002387 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2388 * in audit_context */
2389 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2390 ctx->target_pid = t->tgid;
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05002391 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +11002392 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05002393 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02002394 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05002395 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04002396 return 0;
2397 }
2398
2399 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2400 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2401 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2402 if (!axp)
2403 return -ENOMEM;
2404
2405 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2406 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2407 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2408 }
Adrian Bunk88ae7042007-08-22 14:01:05 -07002409 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04002410
2411 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid;
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05002412 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +11002413 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05002414 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02002415 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05002416 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04002417 axp->pid_count++;
2418
2419 return 0;
Steve Grubbc2f0c7c2005-05-06 12:38:39 +01002420}
Steve Grubb0a4ff8c2007-04-19 10:28:21 -04002421
2422/**
Eric Paris3fc689e2008-11-11 21:48:18 +11002423 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
David Howellsd84f4f92008-11-14 10:39:23 +11002424 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2425 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2426 * @old: the old credentials
Eric Paris3fc689e2008-11-11 21:48:18 +11002427 *
2428 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2429 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2430 *
Eric Paris3fc689e2008-11-11 21:48:18 +11002431 * -Eric
2432 */
David Howellsd84f4f92008-11-14 10:39:23 +11002433int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2434 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
Eric Paris3fc689e2008-11-11 21:48:18 +11002435{
2436 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2437 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2438 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2439 struct dentry *dentry;
2440
2441 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2442 if (!ax)
David Howellsd84f4f92008-11-14 10:39:23 +11002443 return -ENOMEM;
Eric Paris3fc689e2008-11-11 21:48:18 +11002444
2445 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2446 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2447 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2448
2449 dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
2450 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps);
2451 dput(dentry);
2452
2453 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2454 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2455 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2456 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2457
David Howellsd84f4f92008-11-14 10:39:23 +11002458 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
2459 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2460 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
Eric Paris3fc689e2008-11-11 21:48:18 +11002461
David Howellsd84f4f92008-11-14 10:39:23 +11002462 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2463 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2464 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2465 return 0;
Eric Paris3fc689e2008-11-11 21:48:18 +11002466}
2467
2468/**
Eric Parise68b75a02008-11-11 21:48:22 +11002469 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
David Howellsd84f4f92008-11-14 10:39:23 +11002470 * @pid: target pid of the capset call
2471 * @new: the new credentials
2472 * @old: the old (current) credentials
Eric Parise68b75a02008-11-11 21:48:22 +11002473 *
2474 * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2475 * audit system if applicable
2476 */
Al Viro57f71a02009-01-04 14:52:57 -05002477void __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid,
David Howellsd84f4f92008-11-14 10:39:23 +11002478 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
Eric Parise68b75a02008-11-11 21:48:22 +11002479{
Eric Parise68b75a02008-11-11 21:48:22 +11002480 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
Al Viro57f71a02009-01-04 14:52:57 -05002481 context->capset.pid = pid;
2482 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2483 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2484 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2485 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
Eric Parise68b75a02008-11-11 21:48:22 +11002486}
2487
2488/**
Steve Grubb0a4ff8c2007-04-19 10:28:21 -04002489 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
Henrik Kretzschmar6d9525b2007-07-15 23:41:10 -07002490 * @signr: signal value
Steve Grubb0a4ff8c2007-04-19 10:28:21 -04002491 *
2492 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2493 * should record the event for investigation.
2494 */
2495void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2496{
2497 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2498 u32 sid;
David Howells76aac0e2008-11-14 10:39:12 +11002499 uid_t auid = audit_get_loginuid(current), uid;
2500 gid_t gid;
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05002501 unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
Steve Grubb0a4ff8c2007-04-19 10:28:21 -04002502
2503 if (!audit_enabled)
2504 return;
2505
2506 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2507 return;
2508
2509 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
David Howells76aac0e2008-11-14 10:39:12 +11002510 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05002511 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
David Howells76aac0e2008-11-14 10:39:12 +11002512 auid, uid, gid, sessionid);
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02002513 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
Steve Grubb0a4ff8c2007-04-19 10:28:21 -04002514 if (sid) {
2515 char *ctx = NULL;
2516 u32 len;
2517
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02002518 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
Steve Grubb0a4ff8c2007-04-19 10:28:21 -04002519 audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02002520 else {
Steve Grubb0a4ff8c2007-04-19 10:28:21 -04002521 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02002522 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
2523 }
Steve Grubb0a4ff8c2007-04-19 10:28:21 -04002524 }
2525 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
2526 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
2527 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
2528 audit_log_end(ab);
2529}
Al Viro916d7572009-06-24 00:02:38 -04002530
2531struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
2532{
2533 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
2534 if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall))
2535 return NULL;
2536 return &ctx->killed_trees;
2537}