blob: 68d3c6a0ecd635bbeba49c5de2d3e89b50315897 [file] [log] [blame]
85c87212005-04-29 16:23:29 +01001/* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07002 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
3 *
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00005 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05006 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07007 * All Rights Reserved.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
13 *
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
18 *
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
22 *
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
24 *
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
27 *
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
31 *
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -050032 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
33 * 2006.
34 *
Dustin Kirklandb63862f2005-11-03 15:41:46 +000035 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
37 *
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +000038 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +000040 *
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070043 */
44
45#include <linux/init.h>
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070046#include <asm/types.h>
Alan Cox715b49e2006-01-18 17:44:07 -080047#include <asm/atomic.h>
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +000048#include <linux/fs.h>
49#include <linux/namei.h>
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070050#include <linux/mm.h>
51#include <linux/module.h>
Stephen Smalley01116102005-05-21 00:15:52 +010052#include <linux/mount.h>
David Woodhouse3ec3b2f2005-05-17 12:08:48 +010053#include <linux/socket.h>
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -050054#include <linux/mqueue.h>
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070055#include <linux/audit.h>
56#include <linux/personality.h>
57#include <linux/time.h>
David Woodhouse5bb289b2005-06-24 14:14:05 +010058#include <linux/netlink.h>
David Woodhousef5561962005-07-13 22:47:07 +010059#include <linux/compiler.h>
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070060#include <asm/unistd.h>
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +000061#include <linux/security.h>
David Woodhousefe7752b2005-12-15 18:33:52 +000062#include <linux/list.h>
Steve Grubba6c043a2006-01-01 14:07:00 -050063#include <linux/tty.h>
Al Viro473ae302006-04-26 14:04:08 -040064#include <linux/binfmts.h>
Al Viroa1f8e7f72006-10-19 16:08:53 -040065#include <linux/highmem.h>
Al Virof46038f2006-05-06 08:22:52 -040066#include <linux/syscalls.h>
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -040067#include <linux/inotify.h>
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +110068#include <linux/capability.h>
Al Viro5ad4e532009-03-29 19:50:06 -040069#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070070
David Woodhousefe7752b2005-12-15 18:33:52 +000071#include "audit.h"
72
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070073/* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
74 * for saving names from getname(). */
75#define AUDIT_NAMES 20
76
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -040077/* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
78#define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
79
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -050080/* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
81#define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
82
Al Viro471a5c72006-07-10 08:29:24 -040083/* number of audit rules */
84int audit_n_rules;
85
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -040086/* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
87int audit_signals;
88
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +110089struct audit_cap_data {
90 kernel_cap_t permitted;
91 kernel_cap_t inheritable;
92 union {
93 unsigned int fE; /* effective bit of a file capability */
94 kernel_cap_t effective; /* effective set of a process */
95 };
96};
97
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070098/* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
99 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
100 * pointers at syscall exit time).
101 *
102 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
103struct audit_names {
104 const char *name;
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -0400105 int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */
106 unsigned name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700107 unsigned long ino;
108 dev_t dev;
109 umode_t mode;
110 uid_t uid;
111 gid_t gid;
112 dev_t rdev;
Steve Grubb1b50eed2006-04-03 14:06:13 -0400113 u32 osid;
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +1100114 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
115 unsigned int fcap_ver;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700116};
117
118struct audit_aux_data {
119 struct audit_aux_data *next;
120 int type;
121};
122
123#define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
124
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400125/* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
126#define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
127
Al Viro473ae302006-04-26 14:04:08 -0400128struct audit_aux_data_execve {
129 struct audit_aux_data d;
130 int argc;
131 int envc;
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -0700132 struct mm_struct *mm;
Al Viro473ae302006-04-26 14:04:08 -0400133};
134
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400135struct audit_aux_data_pids {
136 struct audit_aux_data d;
137 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -0500138 uid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
139 uid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -0500140 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400141 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -0500142 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400143 int pid_count;
144};
145
Eric Paris3fc689e2008-11-11 21:48:18 +1100146struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
147 struct audit_aux_data d;
148 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
149 unsigned int fcap_ver;
150 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
151 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
152};
153
Eric Parise68b75a02008-11-11 21:48:22 +1100154struct audit_aux_data_capset {
155 struct audit_aux_data d;
156 pid_t pid;
157 struct audit_cap_data cap;
158};
159
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -0400160struct audit_tree_refs {
161 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
162 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
163};
164
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700165/* The per-task audit context. */
166struct audit_context {
Al Virod51374a2006-08-03 10:59:26 -0400167 int dummy; /* must be the first element */
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700168 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500169 enum audit_state state, current_state;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700170 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
171 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700172 int major; /* syscall number */
173 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
174 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
2fd6f582005-04-29 16:08:28 +0100175 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500176 u64 prio;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700177 int name_count;
178 struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
Amy Griffis5adc8a62006-06-14 18:45:21 -0400179 char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */
Jan Blunck44707fd2008-02-14 19:38:33 -0800180 struct path pwd;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700181 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
182 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400183 struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids;
Al Viro4f6b4342008-12-09 19:50:34 -0500184 struct sockaddr_storage *sockaddr;
185 size_t sockaddr_len;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700186 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
Al Virof46038f2006-05-06 08:22:52 -0400187 pid_t pid, ppid;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700188 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
189 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
190 unsigned long personality;
2fd6f582005-04-29 16:08:28 +0100191 int arch;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700192
Al Viroa5cb0132007-03-20 13:58:35 -0400193 pid_t target_pid;
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -0500194 uid_t target_auid;
195 uid_t target_uid;
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -0500196 unsigned int target_sessionid;
Al Viroa5cb0132007-03-20 13:58:35 -0400197 u32 target_sid;
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -0500198 char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
Al Viroa5cb0132007-03-20 13:58:35 -0400199
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -0400200 struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
201 int tree_count;
Al Viro916d7572009-06-24 00:02:38 -0400202 struct list_head killed_trees;
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -0400203
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -0500204 int type;
205 union {
206 struct {
207 int nargs;
208 long args[6];
209 } socketcall;
Al Viroa33e6752008-12-10 03:40:06 -0500210 struct {
211 uid_t uid;
212 gid_t gid;
213 mode_t mode;
214 u32 osid;
Al Viroe816f372008-12-10 03:47:15 -0500215 int has_perm;
216 uid_t perm_uid;
217 gid_t perm_gid;
218 mode_t perm_mode;
219 unsigned long qbytes;
Al Viroa33e6752008-12-10 03:40:06 -0500220 } ipc;
Al Viro73929062008-12-10 06:58:59 -0500221 struct {
222 mqd_t mqdes;
223 struct mq_attr mqstat;
224 } mq_getsetattr;
Al Viro20114f72008-12-10 07:16:12 -0500225 struct {
226 mqd_t mqdes;
227 int sigev_signo;
228 } mq_notify;
Al Viroc32c8af2008-12-14 03:46:48 -0500229 struct {
230 mqd_t mqdes;
231 size_t msg_len;
232 unsigned int msg_prio;
233 struct timespec abs_timeout;
234 } mq_sendrecv;
Al Viro564f6992008-12-14 04:02:26 -0500235 struct {
236 int oflag;
237 mode_t mode;
238 struct mq_attr attr;
239 } mq_open;
Al Viro57f71a02009-01-04 14:52:57 -0500240 struct {
241 pid_t pid;
242 struct audit_cap_data cap;
243 } capset;
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -0500244 };
Al Viro157cf642008-12-14 04:57:47 -0500245 int fds[2];
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -0500246
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700247#if AUDIT_DEBUG
248 int put_count;
249 int ino_count;
250#endif
251};
252
Al Viro55669bf2006-08-31 19:26:40 -0400253#define ACC_MODE(x) ("\004\002\006\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
254static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
255{
256 int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
257 if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
258 n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
259 return n & mask;
260}
261
262static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
263{
Cordeliac4bacef2008-08-18 09:45:51 -0700264 unsigned n;
zhangxiliang1a61c882008-08-02 10:56:37 +0800265 if (unlikely(!ctx))
266 return 0;
Cordeliac4bacef2008-08-18 09:45:51 -0700267 n = ctx->major;
Alan Coxdbda4c02008-10-13 10:40:53 +0100268
Al Viro55669bf2006-08-31 19:26:40 -0400269 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
270 case 0: /* native */
271 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
272 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
273 return 1;
274 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
275 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
276 return 1;
277 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
278 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
279 return 1;
280 return 0;
281 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
282 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
283 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
284 return 1;
285 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
286 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
287 return 1;
288 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
289 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
290 return 1;
291 return 0;
292 case 2: /* open */
293 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
294 case 3: /* openat */
295 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
296 case 4: /* socketcall */
297 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
298 case 5: /* execve */
299 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
300 default:
301 return 0;
302 }
303}
304
Al Viro8b67dca2008-04-28 04:15:49 -0400305static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int which)
306{
307 unsigned index = which & ~S_IFMT;
308 mode_t mode = which & S_IFMT;
zhangxiliang1a61c882008-08-02 10:56:37 +0800309
310 if (unlikely(!ctx))
311 return 0;
312
Al Viro8b67dca2008-04-28 04:15:49 -0400313 if (index >= ctx->name_count)
314 return 0;
315 if (ctx->names[index].ino == -1)
316 return 0;
317 if ((ctx->names[index].mode ^ mode) & S_IFMT)
318 return 0;
319 return 1;
320}
321
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -0400322/*
323 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
324 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
325 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
326 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
327 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
328 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
329 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
330 */
331
332#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
Eric Paris679173b2009-01-26 18:09:45 -0500333static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
334{
335 if (!ctx->prio) {
336 ctx->prio = 1;
337 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
338 }
339}
340
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -0400341static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
342{
343 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
344 int left = ctx->tree_count;
345 if (likely(left)) {
346 p->c[--left] = chunk;
347 ctx->tree_count = left;
348 return 1;
349 }
350 if (!p)
351 return 0;
352 p = p->next;
353 if (p) {
354 p->c[30] = chunk;
355 ctx->trees = p;
356 ctx->tree_count = 30;
357 return 1;
358 }
359 return 0;
360}
361
362static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
363{
364 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
365 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
366 if (!ctx->trees) {
367 ctx->trees = p;
368 return 0;
369 }
370 if (p)
371 p->next = ctx->trees;
372 else
373 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
374 ctx->tree_count = 31;
375 return 1;
376}
377#endif
378
379static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
380 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
381{
382#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
383 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
384 int n;
385 if (!p) {
386 /* we started with empty chain */
387 p = ctx->first_trees;
388 count = 31;
389 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
390 if (!p)
391 return;
392 }
393 n = count;
394 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
395 while (n--) {
396 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
397 q->c[n] = NULL;
398 }
399 }
400 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
401 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
402 q->c[n] = NULL;
403 }
404 ctx->trees = p;
405 ctx->tree_count = count;
406#endif
407}
408
409static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
410{
411 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
412 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
413 q = p->next;
414 kfree(p);
415 }
416}
417
418static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
419{
420#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
421 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
422 int n;
423 if (!tree)
424 return 0;
425 /* full ones */
426 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
427 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
428 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
429 return 1;
430 }
431 /* partial */
432 if (p) {
433 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
434 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
435 return 1;
436 }
437#endif
438 return 0;
439}
440
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400441/* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700442/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
443 * otherwise. */
444static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500445 struct audit_krule *rule,
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700446 struct audit_context *ctx,
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400447 struct audit_names *name,
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700448 enum audit_state *state)
449{
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +1100450 const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
Steve Grubb2ad312d2006-04-11 08:50:56 -0400451 int i, j, need_sid = 1;
Darrel Goeddel3dc7e312006-03-10 18:14:06 -0600452 u32 sid;
453
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700454 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500455 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700456 int result = 0;
457
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500458 switch (f->type) {
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700459 case AUDIT_PID:
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500460 result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700461 break;
Al Viro3c662512006-05-06 08:26:27 -0400462 case AUDIT_PPID:
Alexander Viro419c58f2006-09-29 00:08:50 -0400463 if (ctx) {
464 if (!ctx->ppid)
465 ctx->ppid = sys_getppid();
Al Viro3c662512006-05-06 08:26:27 -0400466 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
Alexander Viro419c58f2006-09-29 00:08:50 -0400467 }
Al Viro3c662512006-05-06 08:26:27 -0400468 break;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700469 case AUDIT_UID:
David Howellsb6dff3e2008-11-14 10:39:16 +1100470 result = audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700471 break;
472 case AUDIT_EUID:
David Howellsb6dff3e2008-11-14 10:39:16 +1100473 result = audit_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700474 break;
475 case AUDIT_SUID:
David Howellsb6dff3e2008-11-14 10:39:16 +1100476 result = audit_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700477 break;
478 case AUDIT_FSUID:
David Howellsb6dff3e2008-11-14 10:39:16 +1100479 result = audit_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700480 break;
481 case AUDIT_GID:
David Howellsb6dff3e2008-11-14 10:39:16 +1100482 result = audit_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700483 break;
484 case AUDIT_EGID:
David Howellsb6dff3e2008-11-14 10:39:16 +1100485 result = audit_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700486 break;
487 case AUDIT_SGID:
David Howellsb6dff3e2008-11-14 10:39:16 +1100488 result = audit_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700489 break;
490 case AUDIT_FSGID:
David Howellsb6dff3e2008-11-14 10:39:16 +1100491 result = audit_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700492 break;
493 case AUDIT_PERS:
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500494 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700495 break;
2fd6f582005-04-29 16:08:28 +0100496 case AUDIT_ARCH:
Daniel Walker9f8dbe92007-10-18 03:06:09 -0700497 if (ctx)
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500498 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
2fd6f582005-04-29 16:08:28 +0100499 break;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700500
501 case AUDIT_EXIT:
502 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500503 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700504 break;
505 case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
David Woodhouseb01f2cc2005-08-27 10:25:43 +0100506 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500507 if (f->val)
508 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
David Woodhouseb01f2cc2005-08-27 10:25:43 +0100509 else
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500510 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
David Woodhouseb01f2cc2005-08-27 10:25:43 +0100511 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700512 break;
513 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400514 if (name)
515 result = audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev),
516 f->op, f->val);
517 else if (ctx) {
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700518 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500519 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700520 ++result;
521 break;
522 }
523 }
524 }
525 break;
526 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400527 if (name)
528 result = audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev),
529 f->op, f->val);
530 else if (ctx) {
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700531 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500532 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700533 ++result;
534 break;
535 }
536 }
537 }
538 break;
539 case AUDIT_INODE:
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400540 if (name)
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -0400541 result = (name->ino == f->val);
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400542 else if (ctx) {
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700543 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -0400544 if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val)) {
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700545 ++result;
546 break;
547 }
548 }
549 }
550 break;
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400551 case AUDIT_WATCH:
Eric Pariscfcad622009-06-11 14:31:36 -0400552 if (name && audit_watch_inode(rule->watch) != (unsigned long)-1)
553 result = (name->dev == audit_watch_dev(rule->watch) &&
554 name->ino == audit_watch_inode(rule->watch));
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400555 break;
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -0400556 case AUDIT_DIR:
557 if (ctx)
558 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
559 break;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700560 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
561 result = 0;
562 if (ctx)
Al Virobfef93a2008-01-10 04:53:18 -0500563 result = audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700564 break;
Darrel Goeddel3a6b9f82006-06-29 16:56:39 -0500565 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
566 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
567 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
568 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
569 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
Darrel Goeddel3dc7e312006-03-10 18:14:06 -0600570 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
571 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
572 match for now to avoid losing information that
573 may be wanted. An error message will also be
574 logged upon error */
Ahmed S. Darwish04305e42008-04-19 09:59:43 +1000575 if (f->lsm_rule) {
Steve Grubb2ad312d2006-04-11 08:50:56 -0400576 if (need_sid) {
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +0200577 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
Steve Grubb2ad312d2006-04-11 08:50:56 -0400578 need_sid = 0;
579 }
Ahmed S. Darwishd7a96f32008-03-01 22:01:11 +0200580 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
Darrel Goeddel3dc7e312006-03-10 18:14:06 -0600581 f->op,
Ahmed S. Darwish04305e42008-04-19 09:59:43 +1000582 f->lsm_rule,
Darrel Goeddel3dc7e312006-03-10 18:14:06 -0600583 ctx);
Steve Grubb2ad312d2006-04-11 08:50:56 -0400584 }
Darrel Goeddel3dc7e312006-03-10 18:14:06 -0600585 break;
Darrel Goeddel6e5a2d12006-06-29 16:57:08 -0500586 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
587 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
588 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
589 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
590 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
591 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
592 also applies here */
Ahmed S. Darwish04305e42008-04-19 09:59:43 +1000593 if (f->lsm_rule) {
Darrel Goeddel6e5a2d12006-06-29 16:57:08 -0500594 /* Find files that match */
595 if (name) {
Ahmed S. Darwishd7a96f32008-03-01 22:01:11 +0200596 result = security_audit_rule_match(
Darrel Goeddel6e5a2d12006-06-29 16:57:08 -0500597 name->osid, f->type, f->op,
Ahmed S. Darwish04305e42008-04-19 09:59:43 +1000598 f->lsm_rule, ctx);
Darrel Goeddel6e5a2d12006-06-29 16:57:08 -0500599 } else if (ctx) {
600 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
Ahmed S. Darwishd7a96f32008-03-01 22:01:11 +0200601 if (security_audit_rule_match(
Darrel Goeddel6e5a2d12006-06-29 16:57:08 -0500602 ctx->names[j].osid,
603 f->type, f->op,
Ahmed S. Darwish04305e42008-04-19 09:59:43 +1000604 f->lsm_rule, ctx)) {
Darrel Goeddel6e5a2d12006-06-29 16:57:08 -0500605 ++result;
606 break;
607 }
608 }
609 }
610 /* Find ipc objects that match */
Al Viroa33e6752008-12-10 03:40:06 -0500611 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
612 break;
613 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
614 f->type, f->op,
615 f->lsm_rule, ctx))
616 ++result;
Darrel Goeddel6e5a2d12006-06-29 16:57:08 -0500617 }
618 break;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700619 case AUDIT_ARG0:
620 case AUDIT_ARG1:
621 case AUDIT_ARG2:
622 case AUDIT_ARG3:
623 if (ctx)
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500624 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700625 break;
Amy Griffis5adc8a62006-06-14 18:45:21 -0400626 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
627 /* ignore this field for filtering */
628 result = 1;
629 break;
Al Viro55669bf2006-08-31 19:26:40 -0400630 case AUDIT_PERM:
631 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
632 break;
Al Viro8b67dca2008-04-28 04:15:49 -0400633 case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
634 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
635 break;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700636 }
637
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +1100638 if (!result) {
639 put_cred(cred);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700640 return 0;
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +1100641 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700642 }
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500643
644 if (ctx) {
645 if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
646 return 0;
647 if (rule->filterkey) {
648 kfree(ctx->filterkey);
649 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
650 }
651 ctx->prio = rule->prio;
652 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700653 switch (rule->action) {
654 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700655 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
656 }
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +1100657 put_cred(cred);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700658 return 1;
659}
660
661/* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
662 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
663 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
664 */
Al Viroe048e022008-12-16 03:51:22 -0500665static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700666{
667 struct audit_entry *e;
668 enum audit_state state;
669
670 rcu_read_lock();
David Woodhouse0f45aa12005-06-19 19:35:50 +0100671 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400672 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state)) {
Al Viroe048e022008-12-16 03:51:22 -0500673 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
674 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700675 rcu_read_unlock();
676 return state;
677 }
678 }
679 rcu_read_unlock();
680 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
681}
682
683/* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
684 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
Steve Grubb23f32d12005-05-13 18:35:15 +0100685 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -0700686 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700687 */
688static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
689 struct audit_context *ctx,
690 struct list_head *list)
691{
692 struct audit_entry *e;
David Woodhousec3896492005-08-17 14:49:57 +0100693 enum audit_state state;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700694
David Woodhouse351bb722005-07-14 14:40:06 +0100695 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
David Woodhousef7056d62005-06-20 16:07:33 +0100696 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
697
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700698 rcu_read_lock();
David Woodhousec3896492005-08-17 14:49:57 +0100699 if (!list_empty(list)) {
Dustin Kirklandb63862f2005-11-03 15:41:46 +0000700 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
701 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
David Woodhousec3896492005-08-17 14:49:57 +0100702
Dustin Kirklandb63862f2005-11-03 15:41:46 +0000703 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400704 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
705 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
706 &state)) {
Dustin Kirklandb63862f2005-11-03 15:41:46 +0000707 rcu_read_unlock();
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500708 ctx->current_state = state;
Dustin Kirklandb63862f2005-11-03 15:41:46 +0000709 return state;
710 }
711 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700712 }
713 rcu_read_unlock();
714 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
715}
716
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400717/* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names[] have been
718 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
719 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names[].
720 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
721 */
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500722void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400723{
724 int i;
725 struct audit_entry *e;
726 enum audit_state state;
727
728 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500729 return;
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400730
731 rcu_read_lock();
732 for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) {
733 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
734 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
735 struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i];
736 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
737 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
738
739 if (list_empty(list))
740 continue;
741
742 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
743 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
744 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) {
745 rcu_read_unlock();
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500746 ctx->current_state = state;
747 return;
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400748 }
749 }
750 }
751 rcu_read_unlock();
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400752}
753
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700754static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
755 int return_valid,
Paul Moore6d208da2009-04-01 15:47:27 -0400756 long return_code)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700757{
758 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
759
760 if (likely(!context))
761 return NULL;
762 context->return_valid = return_valid;
Eric Parisf701b752008-01-07 13:34:51 -0500763
764 /*
765 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
766 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
767 * signal handlers
768 *
769 * This is actually a test for:
770 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
771 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
772 *
773 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
774 */
775 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
776 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
777 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
778 context->return_code = -EINTR;
779 else
780 context->return_code = return_code;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700781
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500782 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy) {
783 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
784 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700785 }
786
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700787 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
788 return context;
789}
790
791static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
792{
793 int i;
794
795#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500796 if (context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +0000797 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700798 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
799 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +0000800 __FILE__, __LINE__,
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700801 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
802 context->name_count, context->put_count,
803 context->ino_count);
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +0000804 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700805 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
806 context->names[i].name,
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +0000807 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +0000808 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700809 dump_stack();
810 return;
811 }
812#endif
813#if AUDIT_DEBUG
814 context->put_count = 0;
815 context->ino_count = 0;
816#endif
817
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +0000818 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -0400819 if (context->names[i].name && context->names[i].name_put)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700820 __putname(context->names[i].name);
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +0000821 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700822 context->name_count = 0;
Jan Blunck44707fd2008-02-14 19:38:33 -0800823 path_put(&context->pwd);
824 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
825 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700826}
827
828static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
829{
830 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
831
832 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
833 context->aux = aux->next;
834 kfree(aux);
835 }
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400836 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
837 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
838 kfree(aux);
839 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700840}
841
842static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
843 enum audit_state state)
844{
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700845 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
846 context->state = state;
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500847 context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700848}
849
850static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
851{
852 struct audit_context *context;
853
854 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
855 return NULL;
856 audit_zero_context(context, state);
Al Viro916d7572009-06-24 00:02:38 -0400857 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700858 return context;
859}
860
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -0700861/**
862 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
863 * @tsk: task
864 *
865 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700866 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
867 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -0700868 * needed.
869 */
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700870int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
871{
872 struct audit_context *context;
873 enum audit_state state;
Al Viroe048e022008-12-16 03:51:22 -0500874 char *key = NULL;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700875
Eric Parisb593d382008-01-08 17:38:31 -0500876 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700877 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
878
Al Viroe048e022008-12-16 03:51:22 -0500879 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700880 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
881 return 0;
882
883 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
Al Viroe048e022008-12-16 03:51:22 -0500884 kfree(key);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700885 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
886 return -ENOMEM;
887 }
Al Viroe048e022008-12-16 03:51:22 -0500888 context->filterkey = key;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700889
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700890 tsk->audit_context = context;
891 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
892 return 0;
893}
894
895static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
896{
897 struct audit_context *previous;
898 int count = 0;
899
900 do {
901 previous = context->previous;
902 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
903 ++count;
904 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
905 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
906 context->serial, context->major,
907 context->name_count, count);
908 }
909 audit_free_names(context);
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -0400910 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
911 free_tree_refs(context);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700912 audit_free_aux(context);
Amy Griffis5adc8a62006-06-14 18:45:21 -0400913 kfree(context->filterkey);
Al Viro4f6b4342008-12-09 19:50:34 -0500914 kfree(context->sockaddr);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700915 kfree(context);
916 context = previous;
917 } while (context);
918 if (count >= 10)
919 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
920}
921
Joy Latten161a09e2006-11-27 13:11:54 -0600922void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +0000923{
924 char *ctx = NULL;
Al Viroc4823bc2007-03-12 16:17:42 +0000925 unsigned len;
926 int error;
927 u32 sid;
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +0000928
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +0200929 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
Al Viroc4823bc2007-03-12 16:17:42 +0000930 if (!sid)
931 return;
932
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +0200933 error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
Al Viroc4823bc2007-03-12 16:17:42 +0000934 if (error) {
935 if (error != -EINVAL)
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +0000936 goto error_path;
937 return;
938 }
939
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +0000940 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +0200941 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
Dustin Kirkland7306a0b2005-11-16 15:53:13 +0000942 return;
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +0000943
944error_path:
Dustin Kirkland7306a0b2005-11-16 15:53:13 +0000945 audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +0000946 return;
947}
948
Joy Latten161a09e2006-11-27 13:11:54 -0600949EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
950
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -0500951static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
Stephen Smalley219f0812005-04-18 10:47:35 -0700952{
Al Viro45d9bb02006-03-29 20:02:55 -0500953 char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
954 struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
Stephen Smalley219f0812005-04-18 10:47:35 -0700955 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
956
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -0500957 /* tsk == current */
958
Al Viro45d9bb02006-03-29 20:02:55 -0500959 get_task_comm(name, tsk);
David Woodhouse99e45ee2005-05-23 21:57:41 +0100960 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
961 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
Stephen Smalley219f0812005-04-18 10:47:35 -0700962
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -0500963 if (mm) {
964 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
965 vma = mm->mmap;
966 while (vma) {
967 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
968 vma->vm_file) {
969 audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
Jan Blunck44707fd2008-02-14 19:38:33 -0800970 &vma->vm_file->f_path);
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -0500971 break;
972 }
973 vma = vma->vm_next;
Stephen Smalley219f0812005-04-18 10:47:35 -0700974 }
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -0500975 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
Stephen Smalley219f0812005-04-18 10:47:35 -0700976 }
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -0500977 audit_log_task_context(ab);
Stephen Smalley219f0812005-04-18 10:47:35 -0700978}
979
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400980static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -0500981 uid_t auid, uid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
982 u32 sid, char *comm)
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400983{
984 struct audit_buffer *ab;
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +0200985 char *ctx = NULL;
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400986 u32 len;
987 int rc = 0;
988
989 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
990 if (!ab)
Eric Paris6246cca2008-01-07 14:01:18 -0500991 return rc;
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400992
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -0500993 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid,
994 uid, sessionid);
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +0200995 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -0500996 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400997 rc = 1;
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +0200998 } else {
999 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1000 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1001 }
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05001002 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
1003 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04001004 audit_log_end(ab);
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04001005
1006 return rc;
1007}
1008
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001009/*
1010 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
1011 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
1012 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundry)
1013 *
1014 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
1015 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
1016 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
1017 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
1018 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
1019 */
1020static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context,
1021 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1022 int arg_num,
1023 size_t *len_sent,
1024 const char __user *p,
1025 char *buf)
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07001026{
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001027 char arg_num_len_buf[12];
1028 const char __user *tmp_p = p;
Eric Parisb87ce6e2009-06-11 14:31:34 -04001029 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 5 is the length of ' a=""' */
1030 size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 5;
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001031 size_t len, len_left, to_send;
1032 size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1033 unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0;
1034 int ret;
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07001035
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001036 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
1037 len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07001038
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001039 /*
1040 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
1041 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
1042 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
1043 * any.
1044 */
Eric Parisb0abcfc2008-02-18 18:23:16 -05001045 if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001046 WARN_ON(1);
1047 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
Eric Parisb0abcfc2008-02-18 18:23:16 -05001048 return -1;
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001049 }
Peter Zijlstra040b3a22007-07-28 00:55:18 +02001050
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001051 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
1052 do {
1053 if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN)
1054 to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1055 else
1056 to_send = len_left;
1057 ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send);
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07001058 /*
1059 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
1060 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
1061 * space yet.
1062 */
Peter Zijlstra040b3a22007-07-28 00:55:18 +02001063 if (ret) {
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07001064 WARN_ON(1);
1065 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
Eric Parisb0abcfc2008-02-18 18:23:16 -05001066 return -1;
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07001067 }
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001068 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1069 has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send);
1070 if (has_cntl) {
1071 /*
1072 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
1073 * send half as much in each message
1074 */
1075 max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2;
1076 break;
1077 }
1078 len_left -= to_send;
1079 tmp_p += to_send;
1080 } while (len_left > 0);
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07001081
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001082 len_left = len;
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07001083
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001084 if (len > max_execve_audit_len)
1085 too_long = 1;
1086
1087 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
1088 for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) {
1089 int room_left;
1090
1091 if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len)
1092 to_send = max_execve_audit_len;
1093 else
1094 to_send = len_left;
1095
1096 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
1097 room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent;
1098 if (has_cntl)
1099 room_left -= (to_send * 2);
1100 else
1101 room_left -= to_send;
1102 if (room_left < 0) {
1103 *len_sent = 0;
1104 audit_log_end(*ab);
1105 *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1106 if (!*ab)
1107 return 0;
1108 }
1109
1110 /*
1111 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
1112 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
1113 */
1114 if ((i == 0) && (too_long))
Jiri Pirkoca96a892009-01-09 16:44:16 +01001115 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d_len=%zu", arg_num,
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001116 has_cntl ? 2*len : len);
1117
1118 /*
1119 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
1120 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
1121 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
1122 */
1123 if (len >= max_execve_audit_len)
1124 ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send);
1125 else
1126 ret = 0;
1127 if (ret) {
1128 WARN_ON(1);
1129 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
Eric Parisb0abcfc2008-02-18 18:23:16 -05001130 return -1;
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001131 }
1132 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1133
1134 /* actually log it */
Jiri Pirkoca96a892009-01-09 16:44:16 +01001135 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d", arg_num);
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001136 if (too_long)
1137 audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i);
1138 audit_log_format(*ab, "=");
1139 if (has_cntl)
Eric Parisb556f8a2008-04-18 10:12:59 -04001140 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send);
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001141 else
Eric Paris9d960982009-06-11 14:31:37 -04001142 audit_log_string(*ab, buf);
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001143
1144 p += to_send;
1145 len_left -= to_send;
1146 *len_sent += arg_num_len;
1147 if (has_cntl)
1148 *len_sent += to_send * 2;
1149 else
1150 *len_sent += to_send;
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07001151 }
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001152 /* include the null we didn't log */
1153 return len + 1;
1154}
1155
1156static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1157 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1158 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi)
1159{
1160 int i;
1161 size_t len, len_sent = 0;
1162 const char __user *p;
1163 char *buf;
1164
1165 if (axi->mm != current->mm)
1166 return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
1167
1168 p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start;
1169
Jiri Pirkoca96a892009-01-09 16:44:16 +01001170 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", axi->argc);
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001171
1172 /*
1173 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
1174 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
1175 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
1176 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
1177 */
1178 buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1179 if (!buf) {
1180 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
1181 return;
1182 }
1183
1184 for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++) {
1185 len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
1186 &len_sent, p, buf);
1187 if (len <= 0)
1188 break;
1189 p += len;
1190 }
1191 kfree(buf);
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07001192}
1193
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +11001194static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
1195{
1196 int i;
1197
1198 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
1199 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
1200 audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]);
1201 }
1202}
1203
1204static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
1205{
1206 kernel_cap_t *perm = &name->fcap.permitted;
1207 kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable;
1208 int log = 0;
1209
1210 if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) {
1211 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm);
1212 log = 1;
1213 }
1214 if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) {
1215 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh);
1216 log = 1;
1217 }
1218
1219 if (log)
1220 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x", name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver);
1221}
1222
Al Viroa33e6752008-12-10 03:40:06 -05001223static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -05001224{
1225 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1226 int i;
1227
1228 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1229 if (!ab)
1230 return;
1231
1232 switch (context->type) {
1233 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1234 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1235 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1236 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1237 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1238 context->socketcall.args[i]);
1239 break; }
Al Viroa33e6752008-12-10 03:40:06 -05001240 case AUDIT_IPC: {
1241 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
1242
1243 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
1244 context->ipc.uid, context->ipc.gid, context->ipc.mode);
1245 if (osid) {
1246 char *ctx = NULL;
1247 u32 len;
1248 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1249 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
1250 *call_panic = 1;
1251 } else {
1252 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1253 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1254 }
1255 }
Al Viroe816f372008-12-10 03:47:15 -05001256 if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1257 audit_log_end(ab);
1258 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1259 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1260 audit_log_format(ab,
1261 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
1262 context->ipc.qbytes,
1263 context->ipc.perm_uid,
1264 context->ipc.perm_gid,
1265 context->ipc.perm_mode);
1266 if (!ab)
1267 return;
1268 }
Al Viroa33e6752008-12-10 03:40:06 -05001269 break; }
Al Viro564f6992008-12-14 04:02:26 -05001270 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
1271 audit_log_format(ab,
1272 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#o mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1273 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1274 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
1275 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
1276 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
1277 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
1278 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
1279 break; }
Al Viroc32c8af2008-12-14 03:46:48 -05001280 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
1281 audit_log_format(ab,
1282 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1283 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1284 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
1285 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
1286 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
1287 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
1288 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1289 break; }
Al Viro20114f72008-12-10 07:16:12 -05001290 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
1291 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1292 context->mq_notify.mqdes,
1293 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
1294 break; }
Al Viro73929062008-12-10 06:58:59 -05001295 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1296 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
1297 audit_log_format(ab,
1298 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1299 "mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
1300 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
1301 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
1302 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
1303 break; }
Al Viro57f71a02009-01-04 14:52:57 -05001304 case AUDIT_CAPSET: {
1305 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
1306 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
1307 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
1308 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
1309 break; }
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -05001310 }
1311 audit_log_end(ab);
1312}
1313
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -05001314static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001315{
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +11001316 const struct cred *cred;
Steve Grubb9c7aa6a2006-03-31 15:22:49 -05001317 int i, call_panic = 0;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001318 struct audit_buffer *ab;
David Woodhouse7551ced2005-05-26 12:04:57 +01001319 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
Steve Grubba6c043a2006-01-01 14:07:00 -05001320 const char *tty;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001321
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -05001322 /* tsk == current */
Al Viro3f2792f2006-07-16 06:43:48 -04001323 context->pid = tsk->pid;
Alexander Viro419c58f2006-09-29 00:08:50 -04001324 if (!context->ppid)
1325 context->ppid = sys_getppid();
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +11001326 cred = current_cred();
1327 context->uid = cred->uid;
1328 context->gid = cred->gid;
1329 context->euid = cred->euid;
1330 context->suid = cred->suid;
David Howellsb6dff3e2008-11-14 10:39:16 +11001331 context->fsuid = cred->fsuid;
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +11001332 context->egid = cred->egid;
1333 context->sgid = cred->sgid;
David Howellsb6dff3e2008-11-14 10:39:16 +11001334 context->fsgid = cred->fsgid;
Al Viro3f2792f2006-07-16 06:43:48 -04001335 context->personality = tsk->personality;
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -05001336
1337 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001338 if (!ab)
1339 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
David Woodhousebccf6ae2005-05-23 21:35:28 +01001340 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1341 context->arch, context->major);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001342 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1343 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1344 if (context->return_valid)
Daniel Walker9f8dbe92007-10-18 03:06:09 -07001345 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
2fd6f582005-04-29 16:08:28 +01001346 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1347 context->return_code);
Alan Coxeb84a202006-09-29 02:01:41 -07001348
Alan Coxdbda4c02008-10-13 10:40:53 +01001349 spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
Al Viro45d9bb02006-03-29 20:02:55 -05001350 if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
1351 tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
Steve Grubba6c043a2006-01-01 14:07:00 -05001352 else
1353 tty = "(none)";
Alan Coxdbda4c02008-10-13 10:40:53 +01001354 spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
1355
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001356 audit_log_format(ab,
1357 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
Al Virof46038f2006-05-06 08:22:52 -04001358 " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
Steve Grubb326e9c82005-05-21 00:22:31 +01001359 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05001360 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001361 context->argv[0],
1362 context->argv[1],
1363 context->argv[2],
1364 context->argv[3],
1365 context->name_count,
Al Virof46038f2006-05-06 08:22:52 -04001366 context->ppid,
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001367 context->pid,
Al Virobfef93a2008-01-10 04:53:18 -05001368 tsk->loginuid,
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001369 context->uid,
1370 context->gid,
1371 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05001372 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty,
1373 tsk->sessionid);
Alan Coxeb84a202006-09-29 02:01:41 -07001374
Alan Coxeb84a202006-09-29 02:01:41 -07001375
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -05001376 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
Eric Paris9d960982009-06-11 14:31:37 -04001377 audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001378 audit_log_end(ab);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001379
David Woodhouse7551ced2005-05-26 12:04:57 +01001380 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
Steve Grubbc0404992005-05-13 18:17:42 +01001381
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -05001382 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001383 if (!ab)
1384 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1385
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001386 switch (aux->type) {
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05001387
Al Viro473ae302006-04-26 14:04:08 -04001388 case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
1389 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001390 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab, axi);
Al Viro473ae302006-04-26 14:04:08 -04001391 break; }
Steve Grubb073115d2006-04-02 17:07:33 -04001392
Eric Paris3fc689e2008-11-11 21:48:18 +11001393 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1394 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1395 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1396 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1397 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1398 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1399 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1400 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1401 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1402 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1403 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1404 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1405 break; }
1406
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001407 }
1408 audit_log_end(ab);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001409 }
1410
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -05001411 if (context->type)
Al Viroa33e6752008-12-10 03:40:06 -05001412 show_special(context, &call_panic);
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -05001413
Al Viro157cf642008-12-14 04:57:47 -05001414 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
1415 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
1416 if (ab) {
1417 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1418 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
1419 audit_log_end(ab);
1420 }
1421 }
1422
Al Viro4f6b4342008-12-09 19:50:34 -05001423 if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1424 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1425 if (ab) {
1426 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1427 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1428 context->sockaddr_len);
1429 audit_log_end(ab);
1430 }
1431 }
1432
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04001433 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1434 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04001435
1436 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1437 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05001438 axs->target_auid[i],
1439 axs->target_uid[i],
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05001440 axs->target_sessionid[i],
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05001441 axs->target_sid[i],
1442 axs->target_comm[i]))
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04001443 call_panic = 1;
Al Viroa5cb0132007-03-20 13:58:35 -04001444 }
1445
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04001446 if (context->target_pid &&
1447 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05001448 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05001449 context->target_sessionid,
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05001450 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04001451 call_panic = 1;
1452
Jan Blunck44707fd2008-02-14 19:38:33 -08001453 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -05001454 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
David Woodhouse8f37d472005-05-27 12:17:28 +01001455 if (ab) {
Jan Blunck44707fd2008-02-14 19:38:33 -08001456 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
David Woodhouse8f37d472005-05-27 12:17:28 +01001457 audit_log_end(ab);
1458 }
1459 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001460 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -04001461 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[i];
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00001462
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -05001463 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001464 if (!ab)
1465 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
David Woodhouse8f37d472005-05-27 12:17:28 +01001466
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001467 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00001468
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -04001469 if (n->name) {
1470 switch(n->name_len) {
1471 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
1472 /* log the full path */
1473 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1474 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name);
1475 break;
1476 case 0:
1477 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1478 * directory component is the cwd */
Eric Parisdef57542009-03-10 18:00:14 -04001479 audit_log_d_path(ab, "name=", &context->pwd);
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -04001480 break;
1481 default:
1482 /* log the name's directory component */
1483 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
Eric Parisb556f8a2008-04-18 10:12:59 -04001484 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name,
1485 n->name_len);
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -04001486 }
1487 } else
1488 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00001489
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -04001490 if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) {
1491 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
1492 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
1493 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1494 n->ino,
1495 MAJOR(n->dev),
1496 MINOR(n->dev),
1497 n->mode,
1498 n->uid,
1499 n->gid,
1500 MAJOR(n->rdev),
1501 MINOR(n->rdev));
1502 }
1503 if (n->osid != 0) {
Steve Grubb1b50eed2006-04-03 14:06:13 -04001504 char *ctx = NULL;
1505 u32 len;
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02001506 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -04001507 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1508 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
Steve Grubb9c7aa6a2006-03-31 15:22:49 -05001509 call_panic = 2;
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02001510 } else {
Steve Grubb1b50eed2006-04-03 14:06:13 -04001511 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02001512 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1513 }
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +00001514 }
1515
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +11001516 audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
1517
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001518 audit_log_end(ab);
1519 }
Eric Parisc0641f22008-01-07 13:49:15 -05001520
1521 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1522 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1523 if (ab)
1524 audit_log_end(ab);
Steve Grubb9c7aa6a2006-03-31 15:22:49 -05001525 if (call_panic)
1526 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001527}
1528
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001529/**
1530 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1531 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1532 *
Al Virofa84cb92006-03-29 20:30:19 -05001533 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001534 */
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001535void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1536{
1537 struct audit_context *context;
1538
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001539 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001540 if (likely(!context))
1541 return;
1542
1543 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
Daniel Walker9f8dbe92007-10-18 03:06:09 -07001544 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1545 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
David Woodhousef5561962005-07-13 22:47:07 +01001546 * in the context of the idle thread */
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -05001547 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -05001548 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -05001549 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
Al Viro916d7572009-06-24 00:02:38 -04001550 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1551 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001552
1553 audit_free_context(context);
1554}
1555
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001556/**
1557 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001558 * @arch: architecture type
1559 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1560 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1561 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1562 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1563 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1564 *
1565 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001566 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1567 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1568 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1569 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1570 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001571 * be written).
1572 */
Al Viro5411be52006-03-29 20:23:36 -05001573void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001574 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1575 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1576{
Al Viro5411be52006-03-29 20:23:36 -05001577 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001578 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1579 enum audit_state state;
1580
Roland McGrath86a1c342008-06-23 15:37:04 -07001581 if (unlikely(!context))
1582 return;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001583
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001584 /*
1585 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001586 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
1587 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
1588 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
1589 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
1590 *
1591 * i386 no
1592 * x86_64 no
Jon Mason2ef94812006-01-23 10:58:20 -06001593 * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001594 *
1595 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
1596 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
1597 */
1598 if (context->in_syscall) {
1599 struct audit_context *newctx;
1600
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001601#if AUDIT_DEBUG
1602 printk(KERN_ERR
1603 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
1604 " entering syscall=%d\n",
1605 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
1606#endif
1607 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
1608 if (newctx) {
1609 newctx->previous = context;
1610 context = newctx;
1611 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
1612 } else {
1613 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
1614 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
1615 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
1616 * to abandon auditing. */
1617 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
1618 }
1619 }
1620 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1621
1622 if (!audit_enabled)
1623 return;
1624
2fd6f582005-04-29 16:08:28 +01001625 context->arch = arch;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001626 context->major = major;
1627 context->argv[0] = a1;
1628 context->argv[1] = a2;
1629 context->argv[2] = a3;
1630 context->argv[3] = a4;
1631
1632 state = context->state;
Al Virod51374a2006-08-03 10:59:26 -04001633 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -05001634 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
1635 context->prio = 0;
David Woodhouse0f45aa12005-06-19 19:35:50 +01001636 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -05001637 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001638 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
1639 return;
1640
David Woodhousece625a82005-07-18 14:24:46 -04001641 context->serial = 0;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001642 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1643 context->in_syscall = 1;
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -05001644 context->current_state = state;
Alexander Viro419c58f2006-09-29 00:08:50 -04001645 context->ppid = 0;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001646}
1647
Al Viroa64e6492008-11-12 18:37:41 -05001648void audit_finish_fork(struct task_struct *child)
1649{
1650 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
1651 struct audit_context *p = child->audit_context;
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -05001652 if (!p || !ctx)
1653 return;
1654 if (!ctx->in_syscall || ctx->current_state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
Al Viroa64e6492008-11-12 18:37:41 -05001655 return;
1656 p->arch = ctx->arch;
1657 p->major = ctx->major;
1658 memcpy(p->argv, ctx->argv, sizeof(ctx->argv));
1659 p->ctime = ctx->ctime;
1660 p->dummy = ctx->dummy;
Al Viroa64e6492008-11-12 18:37:41 -05001661 p->in_syscall = ctx->in_syscall;
1662 p->filterkey = kstrdup(ctx->filterkey, GFP_KERNEL);
1663 p->ppid = current->pid;
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -05001664 p->prio = ctx->prio;
1665 p->current_state = ctx->current_state;
Al Viroa64e6492008-11-12 18:37:41 -05001666}
1667
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001668/**
1669 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001670 * @valid: success/failure flag
1671 * @return_code: syscall return value
1672 *
1673 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001674 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1675 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
1676 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001677 * free the names stored from getname().
1678 */
Al Viro5411be52006-03-29 20:23:36 -05001679void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001680{
Al Viro5411be52006-03-29 20:23:36 -05001681 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001682 struct audit_context *context;
1683
2fd6f582005-04-29 16:08:28 +01001684 context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001685
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001686 if (likely(!context))
Al Viro97e94c42006-03-29 20:26:24 -05001687 return;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001688
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -05001689 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -05001690 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001691
1692 context->in_syscall = 0;
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -05001693 context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
2fd6f582005-04-29 16:08:28 +01001694
Al Viro916d7572009-06-24 00:02:38 -04001695 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1696 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
1697
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001698 if (context->previous) {
1699 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
1700 context->previous = NULL;
1701 audit_free_context(context);
1702 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
1703 } else {
1704 audit_free_names(context);
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -04001705 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001706 audit_free_aux(context);
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04001707 context->aux = NULL;
1708 context->aux_pids = NULL;
Al Viroa5cb0132007-03-20 13:58:35 -04001709 context->target_pid = 0;
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04001710 context->target_sid = 0;
Al Viro4f6b4342008-12-09 19:50:34 -05001711 context->sockaddr_len = 0;
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -05001712 context->type = 0;
Al Viro157cf642008-12-14 04:57:47 -05001713 context->fds[0] = -1;
Al Viroe048e022008-12-16 03:51:22 -05001714 if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
1715 kfree(context->filterkey);
1716 context->filterkey = NULL;
1717 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001718 tsk->audit_context = context;
1719 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001720}
1721
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -04001722static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1723{
1724#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1725 struct audit_context *context;
1726 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1727 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1728 int count;
1729 if (likely(list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches)))
1730 return;
1731 context = current->audit_context;
1732 p = context->trees;
1733 count = context->tree_count;
1734 rcu_read_lock();
1735 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1736 rcu_read_unlock();
1737 if (!chunk)
1738 return;
1739 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1740 return;
1741 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
Eric Paris436c4052008-04-18 10:01:04 -04001742 printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -04001743 audit_set_auditable(context);
1744 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1745 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1746 return;
1747 }
1748 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1749#endif
1750}
1751
1752static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1753{
1754#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1755 struct audit_context *context;
1756 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1757 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1758 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1759 unsigned long seq;
1760 int count;
1761
1762 context = current->audit_context;
1763 p = context->trees;
1764 count = context->tree_count;
1765retry:
1766 drop = NULL;
1767 d = dentry;
1768 rcu_read_lock();
1769 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1770 for(;;) {
1771 struct inode *inode = d->d_inode;
1772 if (inode && unlikely(!list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches))) {
1773 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1774 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1775 if (chunk) {
1776 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1777 drop = chunk;
1778 break;
1779 }
1780 }
1781 }
1782 parent = d->d_parent;
1783 if (parent == d)
1784 break;
1785 d = parent;
1786 }
1787 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1788 rcu_read_unlock();
1789 if (!drop) {
1790 /* just a race with rename */
1791 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1792 goto retry;
1793 }
1794 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1795 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1796 /* OK, got more space */
1797 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1798 goto retry;
1799 }
1800 /* too bad */
1801 printk(KERN_WARNING
Eric Paris436c4052008-04-18 10:01:04 -04001802 "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -04001803 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1804 audit_set_auditable(context);
1805 return;
1806 }
1807 rcu_read_unlock();
1808#endif
1809}
1810
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001811/**
1812 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1813 * @name: name to add
1814 *
1815 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1816 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1817 */
Al Virod8945bb52006-05-18 16:01:30 -04001818void __audit_getname(const char *name)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001819{
1820 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1821
Al Virod8945bb52006-05-18 16:01:30 -04001822 if (IS_ERR(name) || !name)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001823 return;
1824
1825 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1826#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1827 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1828 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1829 dump_stack();
1830#endif
1831 return;
1832 }
1833 BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
1834 context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -04001835 context->names[context->name_count].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1836 context->names[context->name_count].name_put = 1;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001837 context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
Amy Griffise41e8bd2007-02-13 14:14:09 -05001838 context->names[context->name_count].osid = 0;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001839 ++context->name_count;
Jan Blunck44707fd2008-02-14 19:38:33 -08001840 if (!context->pwd.dentry) {
David Woodhouse8f37d472005-05-27 12:17:28 +01001841 read_lock(&current->fs->lock);
Jan Blunck44707fd2008-02-14 19:38:33 -08001842 context->pwd = current->fs->pwd;
1843 path_get(&current->fs->pwd);
David Woodhouse8f37d472005-05-27 12:17:28 +01001844 read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
1845 }
Daniel Walker9f8dbe92007-10-18 03:06:09 -07001846
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001847}
1848
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001849/* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
1850 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
1851 *
1852 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
1853 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
1854 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
1855 */
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001856void audit_putname(const char *name)
1857{
1858 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1859
1860 BUG_ON(!context);
1861 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1862#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1863 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
1864 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1865 if (context->name_count) {
1866 int i;
1867 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
1868 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
1869 context->names[i].name,
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00001870 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001871 }
1872#endif
1873 __putname(name);
1874 }
1875#if AUDIT_DEBUG
1876 else {
1877 ++context->put_count;
1878 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
1879 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
1880 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
1881 " put_count=%d\n",
1882 __FILE__, __LINE__,
1883 context->serial, context->major,
1884 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
1885 context->put_count);
1886 dump_stack();
1887 }
1888 }
1889#endif
1890}
1891
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05001892static int audit_inc_name_count(struct audit_context *context,
1893 const struct inode *inode)
1894{
1895 if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES) {
1896 if (inode)
1897 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data: "
Eric Paris436c4052008-04-18 10:01:04 -04001898 "dev=%02x:%02x, inode=%lu\n",
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05001899 MAJOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
1900 MINOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
1901 inode->i_ino);
1902
1903 else
Eric Paris436c4052008-04-18 10:01:04 -04001904 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data\n");
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05001905 return 1;
1906 }
1907 context->name_count++;
1908#if AUDIT_DEBUG
1909 context->ino_count++;
1910#endif
1911 return 0;
1912}
1913
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +11001914
1915static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
1916{
1917 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
1918 int rc;
1919
1920 memset(&name->fcap.permitted, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t));
1921 memset(&name->fcap.inheritable, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t));
1922 name->fcap.fE = 0;
1923 name->fcap_ver = 0;
1924
1925 if (!dentry)
1926 return 0;
1927
1928 rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
1929 if (rc)
1930 return rc;
1931
1932 name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
1933 name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
1934 name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
1935 name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
1936
1937 return 0;
1938}
1939
1940
Amy Griffis3e2efce2006-07-13 13:16:02 -04001941/* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +11001942static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
1943 const struct inode *inode)
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +00001944{
Amy Griffis3e2efce2006-07-13 13:16:02 -04001945 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
1946 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1947 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
1948 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
1949 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
1950 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02001951 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +11001952 audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +00001953}
1954
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001955/**
1956 * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1957 * @name: name being audited
Randy Dunlap481968f2007-10-21 20:59:53 -07001958 * @dentry: dentry being audited
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001959 *
1960 * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
1961 */
Al Viro5a190ae2007-06-07 12:19:32 -04001962void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001963{
1964 int idx;
1965 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -04001966 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001967
1968 if (!context->in_syscall)
1969 return;
1970 if (context->name_count
1971 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name
1972 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
1973 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1974 else if (context->name_count > 1
1975 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name
1976 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
1977 idx = context->name_count - 2;
1978 else {
1979 /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
1980 * associated name? */
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05001981 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001982 return;
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05001983 idx = context->name_count - 1;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001984 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001985 }
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -04001986 handle_path(dentry);
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +11001987 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], dentry, inode);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001988}
1989
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00001990/**
1991 * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1992 * @dname: inode's dentry name
Randy Dunlap481968f2007-10-21 20:59:53 -07001993 * @dentry: dentry being audited
Amy Griffis73d3ec52006-07-13 13:16:39 -04001994 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00001995 *
1996 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1997 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1998 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1999 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
2000 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
2001 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
2002 * unsuccessful attempts.
2003 */
Al Viro5a190ae2007-06-07 12:19:32 -04002004void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct dentry *dentry,
Amy Griffis73d3ec52006-07-13 13:16:39 -04002005 const struct inode *parent)
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00002006{
2007 int idx;
2008 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05002009 const char *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
Al Viro5a190ae2007-06-07 12:19:32 -04002010 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -04002011 int dirlen = 0;
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00002012
2013 if (!context->in_syscall)
2014 return;
2015
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -04002016 if (inode)
2017 handle_one(inode);
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00002018 /* determine matching parent */
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -04002019 if (!dname)
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05002020 goto add_names;
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00002021
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05002022 /* parent is more likely, look for it first */
2023 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
2024 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00002025
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05002026 if (!n->name)
2027 continue;
2028
2029 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino &&
2030 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
2031 n->name_len = dirlen; /* update parent data in place */
2032 found_parent = n->name;
2033 goto add_names;
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -04002034 }
Steve Grubbac9910c2006-09-28 14:31:32 -04002035 }
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00002036
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05002037 /* no matching parent, look for matching child */
2038 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
2039 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
Amy Griffis73d3ec52006-07-13 13:16:39 -04002040
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05002041 if (!n->name)
2042 continue;
2043
2044 /* strcmp() is the more likely scenario */
2045 if (!strcmp(dname, n->name) ||
2046 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
2047 if (inode)
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +11002048 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, inode);
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05002049 else
2050 n->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
2051 found_child = n->name;
2052 goto add_names;
Steve Grubbac9910c2006-09-28 14:31:32 -04002053 }
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05002054 }
2055
2056add_names:
2057 if (!found_parent) {
2058 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, parent))
2059 return;
2060 idx = context->name_count - 1;
2061 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +11002062 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, parent);
Amy Griffis73d3ec52006-07-13 13:16:39 -04002063 }
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05002064
2065 if (!found_child) {
2066 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
2067 return;
2068 idx = context->name_count - 1;
2069
2070 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
2071 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
2072 * audit_free_names() */
2073 if (found_parent) {
2074 context->names[idx].name = found_parent;
2075 context->names[idx].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2076 /* don't call __putname() */
2077 context->names[idx].name_put = 0;
2078 } else {
2079 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
2080 }
2081
2082 if (inode)
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +11002083 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, inode);
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05002084 else
2085 context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
2086 }
Amy Griffis3e2efce2006-07-13 13:16:02 -04002087}
Trond Myklebust50e437d2007-06-07 22:44:34 -04002088EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
Amy Griffis3e2efce2006-07-13 13:16:02 -04002089
2090/**
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002091 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2092 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2093 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
2094 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
2095 *
2096 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2097 */
Al Viro48887e62008-12-06 01:05:50 -05002098int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
David Woodhousebfb44962005-05-21 21:08:09 +01002099 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07002100{
Al Viro48887e62008-12-06 01:05:50 -05002101 if (!ctx->in_syscall)
2102 return 0;
David Woodhousece625a82005-07-18 14:24:46 -04002103 if (!ctx->serial)
2104 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
David Woodhousebfb44962005-05-21 21:08:09 +01002105 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
2106 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
2107 *serial = ctx->serial;
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -05002108 if (!ctx->prio) {
2109 ctx->prio = 1;
2110 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
2111 }
Al Viro48887e62008-12-06 01:05:50 -05002112 return 1;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07002113}
2114
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05002115/* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
2116static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
2117
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002118/**
2119 * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
2120 * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
2121 * @loginuid: loginuid value
2122 *
2123 * Returns 0.
2124 *
2125 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
2126 */
Steve Grubb456be6c2005-04-29 17:30:07 +01002127int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07002128{
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05002129 unsigned int sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
Steve Grubb41757102006-06-12 07:48:28 -04002130 struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
Steve Grubbc0404992005-05-13 18:17:42 +01002131
Al Virobfef93a2008-01-10 04:53:18 -05002132 if (context && context->in_syscall) {
2133 struct audit_buffer *ab;
Steve Grubb41757102006-06-12 07:48:28 -04002134
Al Virobfef93a2008-01-10 04:53:18 -05002135 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
2136 if (ab) {
2137 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05002138 "old auid=%u new auid=%u"
2139 " old ses=%u new ses=%u",
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +11002140 task->pid, task_uid(task),
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05002141 task->loginuid, loginuid,
2142 task->sessionid, sessionid);
Al Virobfef93a2008-01-10 04:53:18 -05002143 audit_log_end(ab);
Steve Grubbc0404992005-05-13 18:17:42 +01002144 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07002145 }
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05002146 task->sessionid = sessionid;
Al Virobfef93a2008-01-10 04:53:18 -05002147 task->loginuid = loginuid;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07002148 return 0;
2149}
2150
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002151/**
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002152 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2153 * @oflag: open flag
2154 * @mode: mode bits
Randy Dunlap6b962552009-01-05 13:41:13 -08002155 * @attr: queue attributes
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002156 *
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002157 */
Al Viro564f6992008-12-14 04:02:26 -05002158void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, mode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002159{
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002160 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2161
Al Viro564f6992008-12-14 04:02:26 -05002162 if (attr)
2163 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2164 else
2165 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002166
Al Viro564f6992008-12-14 04:02:26 -05002167 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
2168 context->mq_open.mode = mode;
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002169
Al Viro564f6992008-12-14 04:02:26 -05002170 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002171}
2172
2173/**
Al Viroc32c8af2008-12-14 03:46:48 -05002174 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002175 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2176 * @msg_len: Message length
2177 * @msg_prio: Message priority
Al Viroc32c8af2008-12-14 03:46:48 -05002178 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002179 *
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002180 */
Al Viroc32c8af2008-12-14 03:46:48 -05002181void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2182 const struct timespec *abs_timeout)
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002183{
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002184 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
Al Viroc32c8af2008-12-14 03:46:48 -05002185 struct timespec *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002186
Al Viroc32c8af2008-12-14 03:46:48 -05002187 if (abs_timeout)
2188 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec));
2189 else
2190 memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct timespec));
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002191
Al Viroc32c8af2008-12-14 03:46:48 -05002192 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
2193 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
2194 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002195
Al Viroc32c8af2008-12-14 03:46:48 -05002196 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002197}
2198
2199/**
2200 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2201 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
Randy Dunlap6b962552009-01-05 13:41:13 -08002202 * @notification: Notification event
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002203 *
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002204 */
2205
Al Viro20114f72008-12-10 07:16:12 -05002206void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002207{
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002208 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2209
Al Viro20114f72008-12-10 07:16:12 -05002210 if (notification)
2211 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
2212 else
2213 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002214
Al Viro20114f72008-12-10 07:16:12 -05002215 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
2216 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002217}
2218
2219/**
2220 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2221 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2222 * @mqstat: MQ flags
2223 *
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002224 */
Al Viro73929062008-12-10 06:58:59 -05002225void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002226{
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002227 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
Al Viro73929062008-12-10 06:58:59 -05002228 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
2229 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
2230 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002231}
2232
2233/**
Steve Grubb073115d2006-04-02 17:07:33 -04002234 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2235 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2236 *
Steve Grubb073115d2006-04-02 17:07:33 -04002237 */
Al Viroa33e6752008-12-10 03:40:06 -05002238void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
Steve Grubb073115d2006-04-02 17:07:33 -04002239{
Steve Grubb073115d2006-04-02 17:07:33 -04002240 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
Al Viroa33e6752008-12-10 03:40:06 -05002241 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2242 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2243 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
Al Viroe816f372008-12-10 03:47:15 -05002244 context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
Al Viroa33e6752008-12-10 03:40:06 -05002245 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
2246 context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
Steve Grubb073115d2006-04-02 17:07:33 -04002247}
2248
2249/**
2250 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002251 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2252 * @uid: msgq user id
2253 * @gid: msgq group id
2254 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2255 *
Al Viroe816f372008-12-10 03:47:15 -05002256 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002257 */
Al Viroe816f372008-12-10 03:47:15 -05002258void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07002259{
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07002260 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2261
Al Viroe816f372008-12-10 03:47:15 -05002262 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2263 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2264 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2265 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2266 context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07002267}
Steve Grubbc2f0c7c2005-05-06 12:38:39 +01002268
Al Viro473ae302006-04-26 14:04:08 -04002269int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2270{
2271 struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
2272 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
Al Viro473ae302006-04-26 14:04:08 -04002273
Al Viro5ac3a9c2006-07-16 06:38:45 -04002274 if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
Al Viro473ae302006-04-26 14:04:08 -04002275 return 0;
2276
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07002277 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
Al Viro473ae302006-04-26 14:04:08 -04002278 if (!ax)
2279 return -ENOMEM;
2280
2281 ax->argc = bprm->argc;
2282 ax->envc = bprm->envc;
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07002283 ax->mm = bprm->mm;
Al Viro473ae302006-04-26 14:04:08 -04002284 ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2285 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2286 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2287 return 0;
2288}
2289
2290
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002291/**
2292 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2293 * @nargs: number of args
2294 * @args: args array
2295 *
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002296 */
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -05002297void audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
David Woodhouse3ec3b2f2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01002298{
David Woodhouse3ec3b2f2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01002299 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2300
Al Viro5ac3a9c2006-07-16 06:38:45 -04002301 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -05002302 return;
David Woodhouse3ec3b2f2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01002303
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -05002304 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2305 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2306 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
David Woodhouse3ec3b2f2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01002307}
2308
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002309/**
Al Virodb349502007-02-07 01:48:00 -05002310 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2311 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2312 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2313 *
Al Virodb349502007-02-07 01:48:00 -05002314 */
Al Viro157cf642008-12-14 04:57:47 -05002315void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
Al Virodb349502007-02-07 01:48:00 -05002316{
2317 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
Al Viro157cf642008-12-14 04:57:47 -05002318 context->fds[0] = fd1;
2319 context->fds[1] = fd2;
Al Virodb349502007-02-07 01:48:00 -05002320}
2321
2322/**
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002323 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2324 * @len: data length in user space
2325 * @a: data address in kernel space
2326 *
2327 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2328 */
David Woodhouse3ec3b2f2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01002329int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2330{
David Woodhouse3ec3b2f2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01002331 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2332
Al Viro5ac3a9c2006-07-16 06:38:45 -04002333 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
David Woodhouse3ec3b2f2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01002334 return 0;
2335
Al Viro4f6b4342008-12-09 19:50:34 -05002336 if (!context->sockaddr) {
2337 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2338 if (!p)
2339 return -ENOMEM;
2340 context->sockaddr = p;
2341 }
David Woodhouse3ec3b2f2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01002342
Al Viro4f6b4342008-12-09 19:50:34 -05002343 context->sockaddr_len = len;
2344 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
David Woodhouse3ec3b2f2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01002345 return 0;
2346}
2347
Al Viroa5cb0132007-03-20 13:58:35 -04002348void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2349{
2350 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2351
2352 context->target_pid = t->pid;
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05002353 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +11002354 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05002355 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02002356 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05002357 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
Al Viroa5cb0132007-03-20 13:58:35 -04002358}
2359
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002360/**
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002361 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2362 * @sig: signal value
2363 * @t: task being signaled
2364 *
2365 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2366 * and uid that is doing that.
2367 */
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04002368int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
Steve Grubbc2f0c7c2005-05-06 12:38:39 +01002369{
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04002370 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2371 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
2372 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +11002373 uid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t);
Steve Grubbc2f0c7c2005-05-06 12:38:39 +01002374
Al Viro175fc482007-08-08 00:01:46 +01002375 if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
Eric Parisee1d3152008-07-07 10:49:45 -04002376 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) {
Al Viro175fc482007-08-08 00:01:46 +01002377 audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
Al Virobfef93a2008-01-10 04:53:18 -05002378 if (tsk->loginuid != -1)
2379 audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
Al Viro175fc482007-08-08 00:01:46 +01002380 else
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +11002381 audit_sig_uid = uid;
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02002382 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
Al Viro175fc482007-08-08 00:01:46 +01002383 }
2384 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2385 return 0;
Steve Grubbc2f0c7c2005-05-06 12:38:39 +01002386 }
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04002387
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04002388 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2389 * in audit_context */
2390 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2391 ctx->target_pid = t->tgid;
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05002392 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +11002393 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05002394 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02002395 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05002396 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04002397 return 0;
2398 }
2399
2400 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2401 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2402 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2403 if (!axp)
2404 return -ENOMEM;
2405
2406 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2407 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2408 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2409 }
Adrian Bunk88ae7042007-08-22 14:01:05 -07002410 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04002411
2412 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid;
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05002413 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +11002414 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05002415 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02002416 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05002417 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04002418 axp->pid_count++;
2419
2420 return 0;
Steve Grubbc2f0c7c2005-05-06 12:38:39 +01002421}
Steve Grubb0a4ff8c2007-04-19 10:28:21 -04002422
2423/**
Eric Paris3fc689e2008-11-11 21:48:18 +11002424 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
David Howellsd84f4f92008-11-14 10:39:23 +11002425 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2426 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2427 * @old: the old credentials
Eric Paris3fc689e2008-11-11 21:48:18 +11002428 *
2429 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2430 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2431 *
Eric Paris3fc689e2008-11-11 21:48:18 +11002432 * -Eric
2433 */
David Howellsd84f4f92008-11-14 10:39:23 +11002434int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2435 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
Eric Paris3fc689e2008-11-11 21:48:18 +11002436{
2437 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2438 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2439 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2440 struct dentry *dentry;
2441
2442 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2443 if (!ax)
David Howellsd84f4f92008-11-14 10:39:23 +11002444 return -ENOMEM;
Eric Paris3fc689e2008-11-11 21:48:18 +11002445
2446 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2447 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2448 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2449
2450 dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
2451 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps);
2452 dput(dentry);
2453
2454 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2455 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2456 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2457 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2458
David Howellsd84f4f92008-11-14 10:39:23 +11002459 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
2460 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2461 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
Eric Paris3fc689e2008-11-11 21:48:18 +11002462
David Howellsd84f4f92008-11-14 10:39:23 +11002463 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2464 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2465 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2466 return 0;
Eric Paris3fc689e2008-11-11 21:48:18 +11002467}
2468
2469/**
Eric Parise68b75a02008-11-11 21:48:22 +11002470 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
David Howellsd84f4f92008-11-14 10:39:23 +11002471 * @pid: target pid of the capset call
2472 * @new: the new credentials
2473 * @old: the old (current) credentials
Eric Parise68b75a02008-11-11 21:48:22 +11002474 *
2475 * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2476 * audit system if applicable
2477 */
Al Viro57f71a02009-01-04 14:52:57 -05002478void __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid,
David Howellsd84f4f92008-11-14 10:39:23 +11002479 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
Eric Parise68b75a02008-11-11 21:48:22 +11002480{
Eric Parise68b75a02008-11-11 21:48:22 +11002481 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
Al Viro57f71a02009-01-04 14:52:57 -05002482 context->capset.pid = pid;
2483 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2484 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2485 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2486 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
Eric Parise68b75a02008-11-11 21:48:22 +11002487}
2488
2489/**
Steve Grubb0a4ff8c2007-04-19 10:28:21 -04002490 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
Henrik Kretzschmar6d9525b2007-07-15 23:41:10 -07002491 * @signr: signal value
Steve Grubb0a4ff8c2007-04-19 10:28:21 -04002492 *
2493 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2494 * should record the event for investigation.
2495 */
2496void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2497{
2498 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2499 u32 sid;
David Howells76aac0e2008-11-14 10:39:12 +11002500 uid_t auid = audit_get_loginuid(current), uid;
2501 gid_t gid;
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05002502 unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
Steve Grubb0a4ff8c2007-04-19 10:28:21 -04002503
2504 if (!audit_enabled)
2505 return;
2506
2507 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2508 return;
2509
2510 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
David Howells76aac0e2008-11-14 10:39:12 +11002511 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05002512 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
David Howells76aac0e2008-11-14 10:39:12 +11002513 auid, uid, gid, sessionid);
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02002514 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
Steve Grubb0a4ff8c2007-04-19 10:28:21 -04002515 if (sid) {
2516 char *ctx = NULL;
2517 u32 len;
2518
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02002519 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
Steve Grubb0a4ff8c2007-04-19 10:28:21 -04002520 audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02002521 else {
Steve Grubb0a4ff8c2007-04-19 10:28:21 -04002522 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02002523 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
2524 }
Steve Grubb0a4ff8c2007-04-19 10:28:21 -04002525 }
2526 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
2527 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
2528 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
2529 audit_log_end(ab);
2530}
Al Viro916d7572009-06-24 00:02:38 -04002531
2532struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
2533{
2534 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
2535 if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall))
2536 return NULL;
2537 return &ctx->killed_trees;
2538}