commit e6305c43eda10ebfd2ad9e35d6e172ccc7bb3695
author Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Tue Jul 15 21:03:57 2008 -0400
committer Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Sat Jul 26 20:53:14 2008 -0400
tree 8a95bd0e27fb3ce895cca9ef91af2e1605e4cdab
parent 1bd5191d9f5d1928c4efdf604c4164b04bb88dbe

[PATCH] sanitize ->permission() prototype

* kill nameidata * argument; map the 3 bits in ->flags anybody cares
  about to new MAY_... ones and pass with the mask.
* kill redundant gfs2_iop_permission()
* sanitize ecryptfs_permission()
* fix remaining places where ->permission() instances might barf on new
  MAY_... found in mask.

The obvious next target in that direction is permission(9)

folded fix for nfs_permission() breakage from Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

fs/proc/base.c

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 81bce67..d82d800 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -1859,8 +1859,7 @@
  * /proc/pid/fd needs a special permission handler so that a process can still
  * access /proc/self/fd after it has executed a setuid().
  */
-static int proc_fd_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
-				struct nameidata *nd)
+static int proc_fd_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 {
 	int rv;