security: introducing security_request_module
Calling request_module() will trigger a userspace upcall which will load a
new module into the kernel. This can be a dangerous event if the process
able to trigger request_module() is able to control either the modprobe
binary or the module binary. This patch adds a new security hook to
request_module() which can be used by an LSM to control a processes ability
to call request_module().
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
diff --git a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c
index 385c31a..5a7ae57 100644
--- a/kernel/kmod.c
+++ b/kernel/kmod.c
@@ -78,6 +78,10 @@
#define MAX_KMOD_CONCURRENT 50 /* Completely arbitrary value - KAO */
static int kmod_loop_msg;
+ ret = security_kernel_module_request();
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
va_start(args, fmt);
ret = vsnprintf(module_name, MODULE_NAME_LEN, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
