CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the key management code
Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.
Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().
Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id(). In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 14948cf..a6ca39e 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -802,7 +802,7 @@
}
/* allocate a new key */
- key = key_alloc(ktype, description, current->fsuid, current->fsgid,
+ key = key_alloc(ktype, description, current_fsuid(), current_fsgid(),
current, perm, flags);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
key_ref = ERR_CAST(key);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index acc9c89..3f09e5b 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -817,7 +817,7 @@
down_write(&key->sem);
/* if we're not the sysadmin, we can only change a key that we own */
- if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || key->uid == current->fsuid) {
+ if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || key->uid == current_fsuid()) {
key->perm = perm;
ret = 0;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index ba32ca6..a8ebc95 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@
/* allocate a new session keyring */
sprintf(desc, "_req.%u", key->serial);
- keyring = keyring_alloc(desc, current->fsuid, current->fsgid, current,
+ keyring = keyring_alloc(desc, current_fsuid(), current_fsgid(), current,
KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
@@ -90,8 +90,8 @@
goto error_link;
/* record the UID and GID */
- sprintf(uid_str, "%d", current->fsuid);
- sprintf(gid_str, "%d", current->fsgid);
+ sprintf(uid_str, "%d", current_fsuid());
+ sprintf(gid_str, "%d", current_fsgid());
/* we say which key is under construction */
sprintf(key_str, "%d", key->serial);
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@
mutex_lock(&user->cons_lock);
key = key_alloc(type, description,
- current->fsuid, current->fsgid, current, KEY_POS_ALL,
+ current_fsuid(), current_fsgid(), current, KEY_POS_ALL,
flags);
if (IS_ERR(key))
goto alloc_failed;
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@
struct key *key;
int ret;
- user = key_user_lookup(current->fsuid);
+ user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid());
if (!user)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
index bd237b0..729156b 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@
sprintf(desc, "%x", target->serial);
authkey = key_alloc(&key_type_request_key_auth, desc,
- current->fsuid, current->fsgid, current,
+ current_fsuid(), current_fsgid(), current,
KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ | KEY_POS_SEARCH |
KEY_USR_VIEW, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
if (IS_ERR(authkey)) {
