diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a2ebf30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/core/scm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,291 @@
+/* scm.c - Socket level control messages processing.
+ *
+ * Author:	Alexey Kuznetsov, <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
+ *              Alignment and value checking mods by Craig Metz
+ *
+ *		This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ *		modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ *		as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ *		2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/signal.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/major.h>
+#include <linux/stat.h>
+#include <linux/socket.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/fcntl.h>
+#include <linux/net.h>
+#include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/netdevice.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+
+#include <asm/system.h>
+#include <asm/uaccess.h>
+
+#include <net/protocol.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <net/compat.h>
+#include <net/scm.h>
+
+
+/*
+ *	Only allow a user to send credentials, that they could set with 
+ *	setu(g)id.
+ */
+
+static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds)
+{
+	if ((creds->pid == current->tgid || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
+	    ((creds->uid == current->uid || creds->uid == current->euid ||
+	      creds->uid == current->suid) || capable(CAP_SETUID)) &&
+	    ((creds->gid == current->gid || creds->gid == current->egid ||
+	      creds->gid == current->sgid) || capable(CAP_SETGID))) {
+	       return 0;
+	}
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+static int scm_fp_copy(struct cmsghdr *cmsg, struct scm_fp_list **fplp)
+{
+	int *fdp = (int*)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
+	struct scm_fp_list *fpl = *fplp;
+	struct file **fpp;
+	int i, num;
+
+	num = (cmsg->cmsg_len - CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)))/sizeof(int);
+
+	if (num <= 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (num > SCM_MAX_FD)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!fpl)
+	{
+		fpl = kmalloc(sizeof(struct scm_fp_list), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!fpl)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		*fplp = fpl;
+		fpl->count = 0;
+	}
+	fpp = &fpl->fp[fpl->count];
+
+	if (fpl->count + num > SCM_MAX_FD)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	
+	/*
+	 *	Verify the descriptors and increment the usage count.
+	 */
+	 
+	for (i=0; i< num; i++)
+	{
+		int fd = fdp[i];
+		struct file *file;
+
+		if (fd < 0 || !(file = fget(fd)))
+			return -EBADF;
+		*fpp++ = file;
+		fpl->count++;
+	}
+	return num;
+}
+
+void __scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm)
+{
+	struct scm_fp_list *fpl = scm->fp;
+	int i;
+
+	if (fpl) {
+		scm->fp = NULL;
+		for (i=fpl->count-1; i>=0; i--)
+			fput(fpl->fp[i]);
+		kfree(fpl);
+	}
+}
+
+int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *p)
+{
+	struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+	int err;
+
+	for (cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(msg); cmsg; cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR(msg, cmsg))
+	{
+		err = -EINVAL;
+
+		/* Verify that cmsg_len is at least sizeof(struct cmsghdr) */
+		/* The first check was omitted in <= 2.2.5. The reasoning was
+		   that parser checks cmsg_len in any case, so that
+		   additional check would be work duplication.
+		   But if cmsg_level is not SOL_SOCKET, we do not check 
+		   for too short ancillary data object at all! Oops.
+		   OK, let's add it...
+		 */
+		if (!CMSG_OK(msg, cmsg))
+			goto error;
+
+		if (cmsg->cmsg_level != SOL_SOCKET)
+			continue;
+
+		switch (cmsg->cmsg_type)
+		{
+		case SCM_RIGHTS:
+			err=scm_fp_copy(cmsg, &p->fp);
+			if (err<0)
+				goto error;
+			break;
+		case SCM_CREDENTIALS:
+			if (cmsg->cmsg_len != CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct ucred)))
+				goto error;
+			memcpy(&p->creds, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), sizeof(struct ucred));
+			err = scm_check_creds(&p->creds);
+			if (err)
+				goto error;
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto error;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (p->fp && !p->fp->count)
+	{
+		kfree(p->fp);
+		p->fp = NULL;
+	}
+	return 0;
+	
+error:
+	scm_destroy(p);
+	return err;
+}
+
+int put_cmsg(struct msghdr * msg, int level, int type, int len, void *data)
+{
+	struct cmsghdr __user *cm = (struct cmsghdr __user *)msg->msg_control;
+	struct cmsghdr cmhdr;
+	int cmlen = CMSG_LEN(len);
+	int err;
+
+	if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & msg->msg_flags)
+		return put_cmsg_compat(msg, level, type, len, data);
+
+	if (cm==NULL || msg->msg_controllen < sizeof(*cm)) {
+		msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC;
+		return 0; /* XXX: return error? check spec. */
+	}
+	if (msg->msg_controllen < cmlen) {
+		msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC;
+		cmlen = msg->msg_controllen;
+	}
+	cmhdr.cmsg_level = level;
+	cmhdr.cmsg_type = type;
+	cmhdr.cmsg_len = cmlen;
+
+	err = -EFAULT;
+	if (copy_to_user(cm, &cmhdr, sizeof cmhdr))
+		goto out; 
+	if (copy_to_user(CMSG_DATA(cm), data, cmlen - sizeof(struct cmsghdr)))
+		goto out;
+	cmlen = CMSG_SPACE(len);
+	msg->msg_control += cmlen;
+	msg->msg_controllen -= cmlen;
+	err = 0;
+out:
+	return err;
+}
+
+void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
+{
+	struct cmsghdr __user *cm = (struct cmsghdr __user*)msg->msg_control;
+
+	int fdmax = 0;
+	int fdnum = scm->fp->count;
+	struct file **fp = scm->fp->fp;
+	int __user *cmfptr;
+	int err = 0, i;
+
+	if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & msg->msg_flags) {
+		scm_detach_fds_compat(msg, scm);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (msg->msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr))
+		fdmax = ((msg->msg_controllen - sizeof(struct cmsghdr))
+			 / sizeof(int));
+
+	if (fdnum < fdmax)
+		fdmax = fdnum;
+
+	for (i=0, cmfptr=(int __user *)CMSG_DATA(cm); i<fdmax; i++, cmfptr++)
+	{
+		int new_fd;
+		err = security_file_receive(fp[i]);
+		if (err)
+			break;
+		err = get_unused_fd();
+		if (err < 0)
+			break;
+		new_fd = err;
+		err = put_user(new_fd, cmfptr);
+		if (err) {
+			put_unused_fd(new_fd);
+			break;
+		}
+		/* Bump the usage count and install the file. */
+		get_file(fp[i]);
+		fd_install(new_fd, fp[i]);
+	}
+
+	if (i > 0)
+	{
+		int cmlen = CMSG_LEN(i*sizeof(int));
+		if (!err)
+			err = put_user(SOL_SOCKET, &cm->cmsg_level);
+		if (!err)
+			err = put_user(SCM_RIGHTS, &cm->cmsg_type);
+		if (!err)
+			err = put_user(cmlen, &cm->cmsg_len);
+		if (!err) {
+			cmlen = CMSG_SPACE(i*sizeof(int));
+			msg->msg_control += cmlen;
+			msg->msg_controllen -= cmlen;
+		}
+	}
+	if (i < fdnum || (fdnum && fdmax <= 0))
+		msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC;
+
+	/*
+	 * All of the files that fit in the message have had their
+	 * usage counts incremented, so we just free the list.
+	 */
+	__scm_destroy(scm);
+}
+
+struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl)
+{
+	struct scm_fp_list *new_fpl;
+	int i;
+
+	if (!fpl)
+		return NULL;
+
+	new_fpl = kmalloc(sizeof(*fpl), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (new_fpl) {
+		for (i=fpl->count-1; i>=0; i--)
+			get_file(fpl->fp[i]);
+		memcpy(new_fpl, fpl, sizeof(*fpl));
+	}
+	return new_fpl;
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__scm_destroy);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__scm_send);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(put_cmsg);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(scm_detach_fds);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(scm_fp_dup);