CRED: Constify the kernel_cap_t arguments to the capset LSM hooks
Constify the kernel_cap_t arguments to the capset LSM hooks.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index d1ce8be..9f305d4 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -53,8 +53,12 @@
extern int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
extern int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
-extern int cap_capset_check(kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
-extern void cap_capset_set(kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
+extern int cap_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
+extern void cap_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
extern int cap_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
extern void cap_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe);
extern int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
@@ -1293,12 +1297,12 @@
int (*capget) (struct task_struct *target,
kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
- int (*capset_check) (kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- kernel_cap_t *permitted);
- void (*capset_set) (kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- kernel_cap_t *permitted);
+ int (*capset_check) (const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
+ void (*capset_set) (const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
int (*capable) (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit);
int (*acct) (struct file *file);
int (*sysctl) (struct ctl_table *table, int op);
@@ -1560,12 +1564,12 @@
kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
kernel_cap_t *permitted);
-int security_capset_check(kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- kernel_cap_t *permitted);
-void security_capset_set(kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- kernel_cap_t *permitted);
+int security_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
+void security_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
int security_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
int security_acct(struct file *file);
@@ -1755,16 +1759,16 @@
return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
-static inline int security_capset_check(kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+static inline int security_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
return cap_capset_check(effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
-static inline void security_capset_set(kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+static inline void security_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
cap_capset_set(effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index e3f36ef..fb4e240 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -118,8 +118,9 @@
#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
-int cap_capset_check (kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+int cap_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
if (cap_inh_is_capped()
&& !cap_issubset(*inheritable,
@@ -150,8 +151,9 @@
return 0;
}
-void cap_capset_set (kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+void cap_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
current->cap_effective = *effective;
current->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index dca3738..81c956a 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -145,16 +145,16 @@
return security_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
-int security_capset_check(kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+int security_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
return security_ops->capset_check(effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
-void security_capset_set(kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+void security_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
security_ops->capset_set(effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index df99869..9f6da15 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1790,8 +1790,9 @@
return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
-static int selinux_capset_check(kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+static int selinux_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
int error;
@@ -1802,8 +1803,9 @@
return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETCAP);
}
-static void selinux_capset_set(kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+static void selinux_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
secondary_ops->capset_set(effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
