tree 0c3505a04bb1b54926c527644c0ee2f57680c250
parent e0129ef91ed758c06b6557c36124acfb2e1c7305
author Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> 1274910174 -0700
committer Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> 1274976764 -0700

signals: check_kill_permission(): don't check creds if same_thread_group()

Andrew Tridgell reports that aio_read(SIGEV_SIGNAL) can fail if the
notification from the helper thread races with setresuid(), see
http://samba.org/~tridge/junkcode/aio_uid.c

This happens because check_kill_permission() doesn't permit sending a
signal to the task with the different cred->xids.  But there is not any
security reason to check ->cred's when the task sends a signal (private or
group-wide) to its sub-thread.  Whatever we do, any thread can bypass all
security checks and send SIGKILL to all threads, or it can block a signal
SIG and do kill(gettid(), SIG) to deliver this signal to another
sub-thread.  Not to mention that CLONE_THREAD implies CLONE_VM.

Change check_kill_permission() to avoid the credentials check when the
sender and the target are from the same thread group.

Also, move "cred = current_cred()" down to avoid calling get_current()
twice.

Note: David Howells pointed out we could relax this even more, the
CLONE_SIGHAND (without CLONE_THREAD) case probably does not need
these checks too.

Roland said:
: The glibc (libpthread) that does set*id across threads has
: been in use for a while (2.3.4?), probably in distro's using kernels as old
: or older than any active -stable streams.  In the race in question, this
: kernel bug is breaking valid POSIX application expectations.

Reported-by: Andrew Tridgell <tridge@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>		[all kernel versions]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>