debian: apply upstream changes to avoid v2.45.1 being a regression
From https://lore.kernel.org/git/xmqqy187nj4u.fsf@gitster.g/.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com>
diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog
index a7330ec..17cb1e7 100644
--- a/debian/changelog
+++ b/debian/changelog
@@ -1,11 +1,14 @@
-git (1:2.45.1-0.1) unstable; urgency=medium
+git (1:2.45.1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
* new upstream release (see RelNotes/2.44.0.txt, RelNotes/2.45.0.txt).
* new upstream point release (see RelNotes/2.45.1.txt; addresses
CVE-2024-32002, CVE-2024-32004, CVE-2024-32020, CVE-2024-32021 and
CVE-2024-32465; closes: #1071160).
+ * debian/patches/0001..0007: new from upstream: followups intended
+ for v2.45.2 to avoid regressions from the fixes included in
+ v2.45.1 (thx Johannes Schindelin).
- -- Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com> Mon, 20 May 2024 02:51:00 +0000
+ -- Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com> Mon, 20 May 2024 03:36:58 +0000
git (1:2.43.0-1) unstable; urgency=low
diff --git a/debian/patches/0001-hook-plug-a-new-memory-leak.diff b/debian/patches/0001-hook-plug-a-new-memory-leak.diff
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ab74831
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0001-hook-plug-a-new-memory-leak.diff
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 94f95a123b10f3837e181ad93b81f1a4f53bb8fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
+Date: Sat, 18 May 2024 10:32:39 +0000
+Subject: hook: plug a new memory leak
+
+commit 2811ce3a79dc8a0105a6defb59718b35f5b397aa upstream.
+
+In 8db1e8743c0 (clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone,
+2024-03-28), I introduced an inadvertent memory leak that was
+unfortunately not caught before v2.45.1 was released. Here is a fix.
+
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
+Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com>
+---
+ hook.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hook.c b/hook.c
+index eebc4d44734..8de469b134a 100644
+--- a/hook.c
++++ b/hook.c
+@@ -26,8 +26,10 @@ static int identical_to_template_hook(const char *name, const char *path)
+ found_template_hook = access(template_path.buf, X_OK) >= 0;
+ }
+ #endif
+- if (!found_template_hook)
++ if (!found_template_hook) {
++ strbuf_release(&template_path);
+ return 0;
++ }
+
+ ret = do_files_match(template_path.buf, path);
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/0002-Revert-core.hooksPath-add-some-protection-while-cloni.diff b/debian/patches/0002-Revert-core.hooksPath-add-some-protection-while-cloni.diff
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8e1c975
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0002-Revert-core.hooksPath-add-some-protection-while-cloni.diff
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+From 7db946419c29e185f1cc6e544cfb47b442019ac7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
+Date: Sat, 18 May 2024 10:32:41 +0000
+Subject: Revert "core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning"
+
+commit f13e8e2ea56ceef593311b3cff1ba7ba1a493682 upstream.
+
+This defense-in-depth was intended to protect the clone operation
+against future escalations where bugs in `git clone` would allow
+attackers to write arbitrary files in the `.git/` directory would allow
+for Remote Code Execution attacks via maliciously-placed hooks.
+
+However, it turns out that the `core.hooksPath` protection has
+unintentional side effects so severe that they do not justify the
+benefit of the protections. For example, it has been reported in
+https://lore.kernel.org/git/FAFA34CB-9732-4A0A-87FB-BDB272E6AEE8@alchemists.io/
+that the following invocation, which is intended to make `git clone`
+safer, is itself broken by that protective measure:
+
+ git clone --config core.hooksPath=/dev/null <url>
+
+Since it turns out that the benefit does not justify the cost, let's revert
+20f3588efc6 (core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning,
+2024-03-30).
+
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
+Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com>
+---
+ config.c | 13 +------------
+ t/t1800-hook.sh | 15 ---------------
+ 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 27 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/config.c b/config.c
+index 77a0fd2d80e..ae3652b08fa 100644
+--- a/config.c
++++ b/config.c
+@@ -1416,19 +1416,8 @@ static int git_default_core_config(const char *var, const char *value,
+ if (!strcmp(var, "core.attributesfile"))
+ return git_config_pathname(&git_attributes_file, var, value);
+
+- if (!strcmp(var, "core.hookspath")) {
+- if (ctx->kvi && ctx->kvi->scope == CONFIG_SCOPE_LOCAL &&
+- git_env_bool("GIT_CLONE_PROTECTION_ACTIVE", 0))
+- die(_("active `core.hooksPath` found in the local "
+- "repository config:\n\t%s\nFor security "
+- "reasons, this is disallowed by default.\nIf "
+- "this is intentional and the hook should "
+- "actually be run, please\nrun the command "
+- "again with "
+- "`GIT_CLONE_PROTECTION_ACTIVE=false`"),
+- value);
++ if (!strcmp(var, "core.hookspath"))
+ return git_config_pathname(&git_hooks_path, var, value);
+- }
+
+ if (!strcmp(var, "core.bare")) {
+ is_bare_repository_cfg = git_config_bool(var, value);
+diff --git a/t/t1800-hook.sh b/t/t1800-hook.sh
+index 1894ebeb0e8..8b0234cf2d5 100755
+--- a/t/t1800-hook.sh
++++ b/t/t1800-hook.sh
+@@ -185,19 +185,4 @@ test_expect_success 'stdin to hooks' '
+ test_cmp expect actual
+ '
+
+-test_expect_success 'clone protections' '
+- test_config core.hooksPath "$(pwd)/my-hooks" &&
+- mkdir -p my-hooks &&
+- write_script my-hooks/test-hook <<-\EOF &&
+- echo Hook ran $1
+- EOF
+-
+- git hook run test-hook 2>err &&
+- test_grep "Hook ran" err &&
+- test_must_fail env GIT_CLONE_PROTECTION_ACTIVE=true \
+- git hook run test-hook 2>err &&
+- test_grep "active .core.hooksPath" err &&
+- test_grep ! "Hook ran" err
+-'
+-
+ test_done
diff --git a/debian/patches/0003-tests-verify-that-clone-c-core.hooksPath-dev-null-wor.diff b/debian/patches/0003-tests-verify-that-clone-c-core.hooksPath-dev-null-wor.diff
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a494d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0003-tests-verify-that-clone-c-core.hooksPath-dev-null-wor.diff
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From ce34e1b7a072db221190446e79cb373c7f6010a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
+Date: Sat, 18 May 2024 10:32:42 +0000
+Subject: tests: verify that `clone -c core.hooksPath=/dev/null` works again
+
+commit a25a15726f4d1bf1c8362f1b3146096d6a87f965 upstream.
+
+As part of the protections added in Git v2.45.1 and friends,
+repository-local `core.hooksPath` settings are no longer allowed, as a
+defense-in-depth mechanism to prevent future Git vulnerabilities to
+raise to critical level if those vulnerabilities inadvertently allow the
+repository-local config to be written.
+
+What the added protection did not anticipate is that such a
+repository-local `core.hooksPath` can not only be used to point to
+maliciously-placed scripts in the current worktree, but also to
+_prevent_ hooks from being called altogether.
+
+We just reverted the `core.hooksPath` protections, based on the Git
+maintainer's recommendation in
+https://lore.kernel.org/git/xmqq4jaxvm8z.fsf@gitster.g/ to address this
+concern as well as related ones. Let's make sure that we won't regress
+while trying to protect the clone operation further.
+
+Reported-by: Brooke Kuhlmann <brooke@alchemists.io>
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
+Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com>
+---
+ t/t1350-config-hooks-path.sh | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/t/t1350-config-hooks-path.sh b/t/t1350-config-hooks-path.sh
+index f6dc83e2aab..45a04929170 100755
+--- a/t/t1350-config-hooks-path.sh
++++ b/t/t1350-config-hooks-path.sh
+@@ -41,4 +41,11 @@ test_expect_success 'git rev-parse --git-path hooks' '
+ test .git/custom-hooks/abc = "$(cat actual)"
+ '
+
++test_expect_success 'core.hooksPath=/dev/null' '
++ git clone -c core.hooksPath=/dev/null . no-templates &&
++ value="$(git -C no-templates config --local core.hooksPath)" &&
++ # The Bash used by Git for Windows rewrites `/dev/null` to `nul`
++ { test /dev/null = "$value" || test nul = "$value"; }
++'
++
+ test_done
diff --git a/debian/patches/0004-hook-clone-protections-add-escape-hatch.diff b/debian/patches/0004-hook-clone-protections-add-escape-hatch.diff
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b2aa135
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0004-hook-clone-protections-add-escape-hatch.diff
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+From 1f34eea689413fa10a664f4c154b097be7796b0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
+Date: Sat, 18 May 2024 10:32:43 +0000
+Subject: hook(clone protections): add escape hatch
+
+commit 85811d32aca9f0ba324a04bd8709c315d472efbe upstream.
+
+As defense-in-depth measures, v2.39.4 and friends leading up to v2.45.1
+introduced code that detects when hooks have been installed during a
+`git clone`, which is indicative of a common attack vector with critical
+severity that allows Remote Code Execution.
+
+There are legitimate use cases for such behavior, though, for example
+when those hooks stem from Git's own templates, which system
+administrators are at liberty to modify to enforce, say, commit message
+conventions. The git clone protections specifically add exceptions to
+allow for that.
+
+Another legitimate use case that has been identified too late to be
+handled in these security bug-fix versions is Git LFS: It behaves
+somewhat similar to common attack vectors by writing a few hooks while
+running the `smudge` filter during a regular clone, which means that Git
+has no chance to know that the hooks are benign and e.g. the
+`post-checkout` hook can be safely executed as part of the clone
+operation.
+
+To help Git LFS, and other tools behaving similarly (if there are any),
+let's add a new, multi-valued `safe.hook.sha256` config setting. Like
+the already-existing `safe.*` settings, it is ignored in
+repository-local configs, and it is interpreted as a list of SHA-256
+checksums of hooks' contents that are safe to execute during a clone
+operation. Future Git LFS versions will need to write those entries at
+the same time they install the `smudge`/`clean` filters.
+
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
+Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com>
+---
+ Documentation/config/safe.txt | 6 +++
+ hook.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ t/t1800-hook.sh | 15 ++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Documentation/config/safe.txt b/Documentation/config/safe.txt
+index 577df40223a..e2eb4992bef 100644
+--- a/Documentation/config/safe.txt
++++ b/Documentation/config/safe.txt
+@@ -59,3 +59,9 @@ which id the original user has.
+ If that is not what you would prefer and want git to only trust
+ repositories that are owned by root instead, then you can remove
+ the `SUDO_UID` variable from root's environment before invoking git.
++
++safe.hook.sha256::
++ The value is the SHA-256 of hooks that are considered to be safe
++ to run during a clone operation.
+++
++Multiple values can be added via `git config --global --add`.
+diff --git a/hook.c b/hook.c
+index 8de469b134a..9eca6c0103a 100644
+--- a/hook.c
++++ b/hook.c
+@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@
+ #include "environment.h"
+ #include "setup.h"
+ #include "copy.h"
++#include "strmap.h"
++#include "hash-ll.h"
++#include "hex.h"
+
+ static int identical_to_template_hook(const char *name, const char *path)
+ {
+@@ -37,11 +40,66 @@ static int identical_to_template_hook(const char *name, const char *path)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
++static struct strset safe_hook_sha256s = STRSET_INIT;
++static int safe_hook_sha256s_initialized;
++
++static int get_sha256_of_file_contents(const char *path, char *sha256)
++{
++ struct strbuf sb = STRBUF_INIT;
++ int fd;
++ ssize_t res;
++
++ git_hash_ctx ctx;
++ const struct git_hash_algo *algo = &hash_algos[GIT_HASH_SHA256];
++ unsigned char hash[GIT_MAX_RAWSZ];
++
++ if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
++ return -1;
++ res = strbuf_read(&sb, fd, 400);
++ close(fd);
++ if (res < 0)
++ return -1;
++
++ algo->init_fn(&ctx);
++ algo->update_fn(&ctx, sb.buf, sb.len);
++ strbuf_release(&sb);
++ algo->final_fn(hash, &ctx);
++
++ hash_to_hex_algop_r(sha256, hash, algo);
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++static int safe_hook_cb(const char *key, const char *value,
++ const struct config_context *ctx UNUSED, void *d)
++{
++ struct strset *set = d;
++
++ if (value && !strcmp(key, "safe.hook.sha256"))
++ strset_add(set, value);
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++static int is_hook_safe_during_clone(const char *name, const char *path, char *sha256)
++{
++ if (get_sha256_of_file_contents(path, sha256) < 0)
++ return 0;
++
++ if (!safe_hook_sha256s_initialized) {
++ safe_hook_sha256s_initialized = 1;
++ git_protected_config(safe_hook_cb, &safe_hook_sha256s);
++ }
++
++ return strset_contains(&safe_hook_sha256s, sha256);
++}
++
+ const char *find_hook(const char *name)
+ {
+ static struct strbuf path = STRBUF_INIT;
+
+ int found_hook;
++ char sha256[GIT_SHA256_HEXSZ + 1] = { '\0' };
+
+ strbuf_reset(&path);
+ strbuf_git_path(&path, "hooks/%s", name);
+@@ -73,13 +131,14 @@ const char *find_hook(const char *name)
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (!git_hooks_path && git_env_bool("GIT_CLONE_PROTECTION_ACTIVE", 0) &&
+- !identical_to_template_hook(name, path.buf))
++ !identical_to_template_hook(name, path.buf) &&
++ !is_hook_safe_during_clone(name, path.buf, sha256))
+ die(_("active `%s` hook found during `git clone`:\n\t%s\n"
+ "For security reasons, this is disallowed by default.\n"
+- "If this is intentional and the hook should actually "
+- "be run, please\nrun the command again with "
+- "`GIT_CLONE_PROTECTION_ACTIVE=false`"),
+- name, path.buf);
++ "If this is intentional and the hook is safe to run, "
++ "please run the following command and try again:\n\n"
++ " git config --global --add safe.hook.sha256 %s"),
++ name, path.buf, sha256);
+ return path.buf;
+ }
+
+diff --git a/t/t1800-hook.sh b/t/t1800-hook.sh
+index 8b0234cf2d5..cbdf60c451a 100755
+--- a/t/t1800-hook.sh
++++ b/t/t1800-hook.sh
+@@ -185,4 +185,19 @@ test_expect_success 'stdin to hooks' '
+ test_cmp expect actual
+ '
+
++test_expect_success '`safe.hook.sha256` and clone protections' '
++ git init safe-hook &&
++ write_script safe-hook/.git/hooks/pre-push <<-\EOF &&
++ echo "called hook" >safe-hook.log
++ EOF
++
++ test_must_fail env GIT_CLONE_PROTECTION_ACTIVE=true \
++ git -C safe-hook hook run pre-push 2>err &&
++ cmd="$(grep "git config --global --add safe.hook.sha256 [0-9a-f]" err)" &&
++ eval "$cmd" &&
++ GIT_CLONE_PROTECTION_ACTIVE=true \
++ git -C safe-hook hook run pre-push &&
++ test "called hook" = "$(cat safe-hook/safe-hook.log)"
++'
++
+ test_done
diff --git a/debian/patches/0005-hooks-clone-protections-special-case-current-Git-LFS-.diff b/debian/patches/0005-hooks-clone-protections-special-case-current-Git-LFS-.diff
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bad67cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0005-hooks-clone-protections-special-case-current-Git-LFS-.diff
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+From 09595d6984b41cbb6f653643f826fe009c56b493 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
+Date: Sat, 18 May 2024 10:32:44 +0000
+Subject: hooks(clone protections): special-case current Git LFS hooks
+
+commit c65d0f9ee6894cdf7feeb51639870bfaf826c905 upstream.
+
+A notable regression in v2.45.1 and friends (all the way down to
+v2.39.4) has been that Git LFS-enabled clones error out with a message
+indicating that the `post-checkout` hook has been tampered with while
+cloning, and as a safety measure it is not executed.
+
+A generic fix for benign third-party applications wishing to write hooks
+during clone operations has been implemented in the parent of this
+commit: said applications are expected to add `safe.hook.sha256` values
+to a protected config.
+
+However, the current version of Git LFS, v3.5.1, cannot be adapted
+retroactively; Therefore, let's just hard-code the SHA-256 values for
+this version. That way, Git LFS usage will no longer be broken, and the
+next Git LFS version can be taught to add those `safe.hook.sha256`
+entries.
+
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
+Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com>
+---
+ hook.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ t/t1800-hook.sh | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hook.c b/hook.c
+index 9eca6c0103a..fc0548edb66 100644
+--- a/hook.c
++++ b/hook.c
+@@ -88,6 +88,17 @@ static int is_hook_safe_during_clone(const char *name, const char *path, char *s
+
+ if (!safe_hook_sha256s_initialized) {
+ safe_hook_sha256s_initialized = 1;
++
++ /* Hard-code known-safe values for Git LFS v3.4.0..v3.5.1 */
++ /* pre-push */
++ strset_add(&safe_hook_sha256s, "df5417b2daa3aa144c19681d1e997df7ebfe144fb7e3e05138bd80ae998008e4");
++ /* post-checkout */
++ strset_add(&safe_hook_sha256s, "791471b4ff472aab844a4fceaa48bbb0a12193616f971e8e940625498b4938a6");
++ /* post-commit */
++ strset_add(&safe_hook_sha256s, "21e961572bb3f43a5f2fbafc1cc764d86046cc2e5f0bbecebfe9684a0b73b664");
++ /* post-merge */
++ strset_add(&safe_hook_sha256s, "75da0da66a803b4b030ad50801ba57062c6196105eb1d2251590d100edb9390b");
++
+ git_protected_config(safe_hook_cb, &safe_hook_sha256s);
+ }
+
+diff --git a/t/t1800-hook.sh b/t/t1800-hook.sh
+index cbdf60c451a..c51be5f7a06 100755
+--- a/t/t1800-hook.sh
++++ b/t/t1800-hook.sh
+@@ -200,4 +200,24 @@ test_expect_success '`safe.hook.sha256` and clone protections' '
+ test "called hook" = "$(cat safe-hook/safe-hook.log)"
+ '
+
++write_lfs_pre_push_hook () {
++ write_script "$1" <<-\EOF
++ command -v git-lfs >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo >&2 "\nThis repository is configured for Git LFS but 'git-lfs' was not found on your path. If you no longer wish to use Git LFS, remove this hook by deleting the 'pre-push' file in the hooks directory (set by 'core.hookspath'; usually '.git/hooks').\n"; exit 2; }
++ git lfs pre-push "$@"
++ EOF
++}
++
++test_expect_success 'Git LFS special-handling in clone protections' '
++ git init lfs-hooks &&
++ write_lfs_pre_push_hook lfs-hooks/.git/hooks/pre-push &&
++ write_script git-lfs <<-\EOF &&
++ echo "called $*" >fake-git-lfs.log
++ EOF
++
++ PATH="$PWD:$PATH" GIT_CLONE_PROTECTION_ACTIVE=true \
++ git -C lfs-hooks hook run pre-push &&
++ test_write_lines "called pre-push" >expect &&
++ test_cmp lfs-hooks/fake-git-lfs.log expect
++'
++
+ test_done
diff --git a/debian/patches/0006-hooks-clone-protections-simplify-templates-hooks-vali.diff b/debian/patches/0006-hooks-clone-protections-simplify-templates-hooks-vali.diff
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a0642e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0006-hooks-clone-protections-simplify-templates-hooks-vali.diff
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+From 8813bb5f4109991b88c98584a4abbb2d06cfbc28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
+Date: Sat, 18 May 2024 10:32:45 +0000
+Subject: hooks(clone protections): simplify templates hooks validation
+
+commit eff37e9b1dec25a3e1297eb89a36d8e68fe01b40 upstream.
+
+When an active hook is encountered during a clone operation, to protect
+against Remote Code Execution attack vectors, Git checks whether the
+hook was copied over from the templates directory.
+
+When that logic was introduced, there was no other way to check this
+than to add a function to compare files.
+
+In the meantime, we've added code to compute the SHA-256 checksum of a
+given hook and compare that checksum against a list of known-safe ones.
+
+Let's simplify the logic by adding to said list when copying the
+templates' hooks.
+
+We need to be careful to support multi-process operations such as
+recursive submodule clones: In such a scenario, the list of SHA-256
+checksums that is kept in memory is not enough, we also have to pass the
+information down to child processes via `GIT_CONFIG_PARAMETERS`.
+
+Extend the regression test in t5601 to ensure that recursive clones are
+handled as expected.
+
+Note: Technically there is no way that the checksums computed while
+initializing the submodules' gitdirs can be passed to the process that
+performs the checkout: For historical reasons, these operations are
+performed in processes spawned in separate loops from the
+super-project's `git clone` process. But since the templates from which
+the submodules are initialized are the very same as the ones from which
+the super-project is initialized, we can get away with using the list of
+SHA-256 checksums that is computed when initializing the super-project
+and passing that down to the `submodule--helper` processes that perform
+the recursive checkout.
+
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
+Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com>
+---
+ hook.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++---------------------------
+ hook.h | 10 ++++++++++
+ setup.c | 7 +++++++
+ t/t5601-clone.sh | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
+ 4 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hook.c b/hook.c
+index fc0548edb66..8ac51c9912b 100644
+--- a/hook.c
++++ b/hook.c
+@@ -14,32 +14,6 @@
+ #include "hash-ll.h"
+ #include "hex.h"
+
+-static int identical_to_template_hook(const char *name, const char *path)
+-{
+- const char *env = getenv("GIT_CLONE_TEMPLATE_DIR");
+- const char *template_dir = get_template_dir(env && *env ? env : NULL);
+- struct strbuf template_path = STRBUF_INIT;
+- int found_template_hook, ret;
+-
+- strbuf_addf(&template_path, "%s/hooks/%s", template_dir, name);
+- found_template_hook = access(template_path.buf, X_OK) >= 0;
+-#ifdef STRIP_EXTENSION
+- if (!found_template_hook) {
+- strbuf_addstr(&template_path, STRIP_EXTENSION);
+- found_template_hook = access(template_path.buf, X_OK) >= 0;
+- }
+-#endif
+- if (!found_template_hook) {
+- strbuf_release(&template_path);
+- return 0;
+- }
+-
+- ret = do_files_match(template_path.buf, path);
+-
+- strbuf_release(&template_path);
+- return ret;
+-}
+-
+ static struct strset safe_hook_sha256s = STRSET_INIT;
+ static int safe_hook_sha256s_initialized;
+
+@@ -70,6 +44,22 @@ static int get_sha256_of_file_contents(const char *path, char *sha256)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++void add_safe_hook(const char *path)
++{
++ char sha256[GIT_SHA256_HEXSZ + 1] = { '\0' };
++
++ if (!get_sha256_of_file_contents(path, sha256)) {
++ char *p;
++
++ strset_add(&safe_hook_sha256s, sha256);
++
++ /* support multi-process operations e.g. recursive clones */
++ p = xstrfmt("safe.hook.sha256=%s", sha256);
++ git_config_push_parameter(p);
++ free(p);
++ }
++}
++
+ static int safe_hook_cb(const char *key, const char *value,
+ const struct config_context *ctx UNUSED, void *d)
+ {
+@@ -142,7 +132,6 @@ const char *find_hook(const char *name)
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (!git_hooks_path && git_env_bool("GIT_CLONE_PROTECTION_ACTIVE", 0) &&
+- !identical_to_template_hook(name, path.buf) &&
+ !is_hook_safe_during_clone(name, path.buf, sha256))
+ die(_("active `%s` hook found during `git clone`:\n\t%s\n"
+ "For security reasons, this is disallowed by default.\n"
+diff --git a/hook.h b/hook.h
+index 19ab9a5806e..b4770d9bd88 100644
+--- a/hook.h
++++ b/hook.h
+@@ -87,4 +87,14 @@ int run_hooks(const char *hook_name);
+ * hook. This function behaves like the old run_hook_le() API.
+ */
+ int run_hooks_l(const char *hook_name, ...);
++
++/**
++ * Mark the contents of the provided path as safe to run during a clone
++ * operation.
++ *
++ * This function is mainly used when copying templates to mark the
++ * just-copied hooks as benign.
++ */
++void add_safe_hook(const char *path);
++
+ #endif
+diff --git a/setup.c b/setup.c
+index 30f243fc32d..25828a85ec3 100644
+--- a/setup.c
++++ b/setup.c
+@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
+ #include "trace2.h"
+ #include "worktree.h"
+ #include "exec-cmd.h"
++#include "run-command.h"
++#include "hook.h"
+
+ static int inside_git_dir = -1;
+ static int inside_work_tree = -1;
+@@ -1868,6 +1870,7 @@ static void copy_templates_1(struct strbuf *path, struct strbuf *template_path,
+ size_t path_baselen = path->len;
+ size_t template_baselen = template_path->len;
+ struct dirent *de;
++ int is_hooks_dir = ends_with(template_path->buf, "/hooks/");
+
+ /* Note: if ".git/hooks" file exists in the repository being
+ * re-initialized, /etc/core-git/templates/hooks/update would
+@@ -1920,6 +1923,10 @@ static void copy_templates_1(struct strbuf *path, struct strbuf *template_path,
+ strbuf_release(&lnk);
+ }
+ else if (S_ISREG(st_template.st_mode)) {
++ if (is_hooks_dir &&
++ is_executable(template_path->buf))
++ add_safe_hook(template_path->buf);
++
+ if (copy_file(path->buf, template_path->buf, st_template.st_mode))
+ die_errno(_("cannot copy '%s' to '%s'"),
+ template_path->buf, path->buf);
+diff --git a/t/t5601-clone.sh b/t/t5601-clone.sh
+index deb1c282c71..ca3a8d1ebed 100755
+--- a/t/t5601-clone.sh
++++ b/t/t5601-clone.sh
+@@ -836,6 +836,25 @@ test_expect_success 'clone with init.templatedir runs hooks' '
+ git config --unset init.templateDir &&
+ test_grep ! "active .* hook found" err &&
+ test_path_is_missing hook-run-local-config/hook.run
++ ) &&
++
++ test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
++ git -C tmpl/hooks submodule add "$(pwd)/tmpl/hooks" sub &&
++ test_tick &&
++ git -C tmpl/hooks add .gitmodules sub &&
++ git -C tmpl/hooks commit -m submodule &&
++
++ (
++ sane_unset GIT_TEMPLATE_DIR &&
++ NO_SET_GIT_TEMPLATE_DIR=t &&
++ export NO_SET_GIT_TEMPLATE_DIR &&
++
++ git -c init.templateDir="$(pwd)/tmpl" \
++ clone --recurse-submodules \
++ tmpl/hooks hook-run-submodule 2>err &&
++ test_grep ! "active .* hook found" err &&
++ test_path_is_file hook-run-submodule/hook.run &&
++ test_path_is_file hook-run-submodule/sub/hook.run
+ )
+ '
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/0007-Revert-Add-a-helper-function-to-compare-file-contents.diff b/debian/patches/0007-Revert-Add-a-helper-function-to-compare-file-contents.diff
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6cf2874
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0007-Revert-Add-a-helper-function-to-compare-file-contents.diff
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+From 13b17dea6c851b21ceb9ce163cdd7338f1ec4ecf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
+Date: Sat, 18 May 2024 10:32:46 +0000
+Subject: Revert "Add a helper function to compare file contents"
+
+commit 851218a8af645b0abd64882d2b88bc984aa762e9 upstream.
+
+Now that during a `git clone`, the hooks' contents are no longer
+compared to the templates' files', the caller for which the
+`do_files_match()` function was introduced is gone, and therefore this
+function can be retired, too.
+
+This reverts commit 584de0b4c23 (Add a helper function to compare file
+contents, 2024-03-30).
+
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
+Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com>
+---
+ copy.c | 58 --------------------------------------
+ copy.h | 14 ---------
+ t/helper/test-path-utils.c | 10 -------
+ t/t0060-path-utils.sh | 41 ---------------------------
+ 4 files changed, 123 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/copy.c b/copy.c
+index 3df156f6cea..d9d20920126 100644
+--- a/copy.c
++++ b/copy.c
+@@ -70,61 +70,3 @@ int copy_file_with_time(const char *dst, const char *src, int mode)
+ return copy_times(dst, src);
+ return status;
+ }
+-
+-static int do_symlinks_match(const char *path1, const char *path2)
+-{
+- struct strbuf buf1 = STRBUF_INIT, buf2 = STRBUF_INIT;
+- int ret = 0;
+-
+- if (!strbuf_readlink(&buf1, path1, 0) &&
+- !strbuf_readlink(&buf2, path2, 0))
+- ret = !strcmp(buf1.buf, buf2.buf);
+-
+- strbuf_release(&buf1);
+- strbuf_release(&buf2);
+- return ret;
+-}
+-
+-int do_files_match(const char *path1, const char *path2)
+-{
+- struct stat st1, st2;
+- int fd1 = -1, fd2 = -1, ret = 1;
+- char buf1[8192], buf2[8192];
+-
+- if ((fd1 = open_nofollow(path1, O_RDONLY)) < 0 ||
+- fstat(fd1, &st1) || !S_ISREG(st1.st_mode)) {
+- if (fd1 < 0 && errno == ELOOP)
+- /* maybe this is a symbolic link? */
+- return do_symlinks_match(path1, path2);
+- ret = 0;
+- } else if ((fd2 = open_nofollow(path2, O_RDONLY)) < 0 ||
+- fstat(fd2, &st2) || !S_ISREG(st2.st_mode)) {
+- ret = 0;
+- }
+-
+- if (ret)
+- /* to match, neither must be executable, or both */
+- ret = !(st1.st_mode & 0111) == !(st2.st_mode & 0111);
+-
+- if (ret)
+- ret = st1.st_size == st2.st_size;
+-
+- while (ret) {
+- ssize_t len1 = read_in_full(fd1, buf1, sizeof(buf1));
+- ssize_t len2 = read_in_full(fd2, buf2, sizeof(buf2));
+-
+- if (len1 < 0 || len2 < 0 || len1 != len2)
+- ret = 0; /* read error or different file size */
+- else if (!len1) /* len2 is also 0; hit EOF on both */
+- break; /* ret is still true */
+- else
+- ret = !memcmp(buf1, buf2, len1);
+- }
+-
+- if (fd1 >= 0)
+- close(fd1);
+- if (fd2 >= 0)
+- close(fd2);
+-
+- return ret;
+-}
+diff --git a/copy.h b/copy.h
+index 057259a3a7a..2af77cba864 100644
+--- a/copy.h
++++ b/copy.h
+@@ -7,18 +7,4 @@ int copy_fd(int ifd, int ofd);
+ int copy_file(const char *dst, const char *src, int mode);
+ int copy_file_with_time(const char *dst, const char *src, int mode);
+
+-/*
+- * Compare the file mode and contents of two given files.
+- *
+- * If both files are actually symbolic links, the function returns 1 if the link
+- * targets are identical or 0 if they are not.
+- *
+- * If any of the two files cannot be accessed or in case of read failures, this
+- * function returns 0.
+- *
+- * If the file modes and contents are identical, the function returns 1,
+- * otherwise it returns 0.
+- */
+-int do_files_match(const char *path1, const char *path2);
+-
+ #endif /* COPY_H */
+diff --git a/t/helper/test-path-utils.c b/t/helper/test-path-utils.c
+index 023ed2e1a78..bf0e23ed505 100644
+--- a/t/helper/test-path-utils.c
++++ b/t/helper/test-path-utils.c
+@@ -501,16 +501,6 @@ int cmd__path_utils(int argc, const char **argv)
+ return !!res;
+ }
+
+- if (argc == 4 && !strcmp(argv[1], "do_files_match")) {
+- int ret = do_files_match(argv[2], argv[3]);
+-
+- if (ret)
+- printf("equal\n");
+- else
+- printf("different\n");
+- return !ret;
+- }
+-
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: unknown function name: %s\n", argv[0],
+ argv[1] ? argv[1] : "(there was none)");
+ return 1;
+diff --git a/t/t0060-path-utils.sh b/t/t0060-path-utils.sh
+index 85686ee15da..0afa3d0d312 100755
+--- a/t/t0060-path-utils.sh
++++ b/t/t0060-path-utils.sh
+@@ -610,45 +610,4 @@ test_expect_success !VALGRIND,RUNTIME_PREFIX,CAN_EXEC_IN_PWD '%(prefix)/ works'
+ test_cmp expect actual
+ '
+
+-test_expect_success 'do_files_match()' '
+- test_seq 0 10 >0-10.txt &&
+- test_seq -1 10 >-1-10.txt &&
+- test_seq 1 10 >1-10.txt &&
+- test_seq 1 9 >1-9.txt &&
+- test_seq 0 8 >0-8.txt &&
+-
+- test-tool path-utils do_files_match 0-10.txt 0-10.txt >out &&
+-
+- assert_fails() {
+- test_must_fail \
+- test-tool path-utils do_files_match "$1" "$2" >out &&
+- grep different out
+- } &&
+-
+- assert_fails 0-8.txt 1-9.txt &&
+- assert_fails -1-10.txt 0-10.txt &&
+- assert_fails 1-10.txt 1-9.txt &&
+- assert_fails 1-10.txt .git &&
+- assert_fails does-not-exist 1-10.txt &&
+-
+- if test_have_prereq FILEMODE
+- then
+- cp 0-10.txt 0-10.x &&
+- chmod a+x 0-10.x &&
+- assert_fails 0-10.txt 0-10.x
+- fi &&
+-
+- if test_have_prereq SYMLINKS
+- then
+- ln -sf 0-10.txt symlink &&
+- ln -s 0-10.txt another-symlink &&
+- ln -s over-the-ocean yet-another-symlink &&
+- ln -s "$PWD/0-10.txt" absolute-symlink &&
+- assert_fails 0-10.txt symlink &&
+- test-tool path-utils do_files_match symlink another-symlink &&
+- assert_fails symlink yet-another-symlink &&
+- assert_fails symlink absolute-symlink
+- fi
+-'
+-
+ test_done
diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7ff1f37
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/series
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+0001-hook-plug-a-new-memory-leak.diff
+0002-Revert-core.hooksPath-add-some-protection-while-cloni.diff
+0003-tests-verify-that-clone-c-core.hooksPath-dev-null-wor.diff
+0004-hook-clone-protections-add-escape-hatch.diff
+0005-hooks-clone-protections-special-case-current-Git-LFS-.diff
+0006-hooks-clone-protections-simplify-templates-hooks-vali.diff
+0007-Revert-Add-a-helper-function-to-compare-file-contents.diff
